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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the rotating-presidencies 
ability to pursue national preferences and examines the consequences of these 
changes on the potential evolution of the EU as a whole.  By using a qualitative 
text analysis and conducting a literature review this thesis acknowledges the 
subjective nature of a policy environment where almost all of the data and records 
of negotiation are kept behind closed doors.  
The literature review examines the theories and current thinking around leadership 
and negotiation with a particular emphasis on the European Union and the role of 
the rotating-Presidency. These theories examine the ability of the rotating-
Presidency to act as a policy innovator through agenda- setting, prioritizing 
agendas and management of negotiations to elicit an outcome that is congruent 
with the national preferences of the Member State holding the office of the 
rotating-presidency.  
This thesis reviews the hypothesis that the Lisbon Treaty has removed the powers 
of the rotating-presidency by transferring agenda setting power to the elected-
presidency and attempts to highlight trends in legislative outcomes that could 
explain a reduction in legislative vigour by the Council and the situation whereby 
a Member State’s ability to influence priorities or outcomes congruent with their 
national interests is contingent on the power and size of the Member State. The 
result of which could lead to a reduction in interest in the position of the rotating-
presidency and the institutions of the EU by the Member States.  
Keywords:  Lisbon Treaty, negotiation, rotating-presidency, EU, international 
relations 
Words: 21,549 
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1. Introduction 
”Nothing gets done without people but that nothings lasts without institutions” – Jean Monnet 
 
1.1 Problematising the changing institutional framework 
 The Lisbon Treaty changed the institutional structure of the European Union but the question 
remains as to how these institutional changes will affect the evolution of the EU—this thesis 
attempts to problematise and propose some answers to that question in relation to the institution of 
the rotating-Presidency and the ability of the Member States influence that evolution. 
The ability of Member States to shape policy outcomes provides a greater understanding how the 
Member States contribute to the evolution and dynamism of the EU.  Additionally, understanding 
the provision of asymmetric power and the limits of leadership allows a greater understanding of 
negotiation and decision making processes. 
1.2 Overview  
Although the Council of the European Union (hence forth referred to as the Council) does not have 
the power to pass laws by itself, however it acted as the agenda-setter that sets out the general 
political priorities for the European Union. During each six month term of office the Council 
gathers representatives from all the EU Member States, the presiding President of the Council of 
the EU and the President of the Commission EU to discuss and propose legislation within the 
EU.
1&2
 As a result, the Member State that held the Presidency would have had significant power to 
determine, control and manage the agenda, decide which parties held the floor for discussion and 
debate, as well as creating side negotiations when developing priorities for the length of the six-
month period
3
. 
To understand how the rotating-presidencies have pursued national interests can be understood from 
previous research into leadership and negotiation processes of the EU as covering in Section 2.  
However since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the rotating-Presidency powers have been 
reduced to presenting the agenda for the next six months to the European Parliament (EP) as well 
as chairing some internal issues within the Council of the EU. The role of agenda-setting, 
                                                     
1
 EU (2009) November 2009 – Lisbon Treaty background paper  -
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111298.pdf 
2
 EU website 2012 http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-council/index_en.htm  
3
 Tallberg:2006:204 
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negotiation management and chairing for external issues falls to the newly elected-President of the 
Council of the European Union and the High Representative. The new roles for these positions are 
covered below in sections 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and 1.2.3. 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate the ability of the rotating-presidencies of the European Union 
(EU) to achieve outcomes that reflect national preferences of the Member State in a post-Lisbon 
environment and determine any consequences of this institutional change on the future 
development and evolution of the EU. Therefore, the research question is to investigate how the 
Treaty of the European Union impacts the ability of Member States holding the office of the 
President of the Council of the EU, to secure outcomes that are concordant with national interest 
during their six-month term of office. 
Using a qualitative text analysis, this paper evaluates the final trio rotating-presidencies prior to the 
Lisbon Treaty and the trio-presidencies directly after
4
, to assess if the position of the post-Lisbon 
rotating-presidency has been stripped of its power to influence negotiation outcomes in the EU. The 
methodology for reviewing national interests and the data sampling techniques are more clearly 
articulated in section 3 of this paper. In Sections 4 through to 10, a summary of each of the 
presidencies between 1
st
 July 2008 and the 31
st
 June 2011 can be found with an assessment of the 
priorities and actions of the presidencies to observe if national interests were pursued. 
The next section outlines the results on an aggregate level, observing trends and changes in the 
pursuit of national interest. The final section, Section 12 defines what these results could mean for 
the evolution of the EU and assesses the effect these institutional changes to the structure of the 
Council Presidency will have on the course of European integration and the outcomes brokered.  
1.3 The Lisbon Treaty 
It has been said that the Lisbon Treaty will be the last significant change to the structure of the 
European Union for a significant period of time
5
--making the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009 a significant turning point in the history of the European Union. Its predecessor, the Treaty for 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, was accepted by the Member States but voted down by two 
separate Member State referenda.  A similar fate could have awaited the Lisbon Treaty, however, it 
was eventually ratified by the Czech Republic President and an Irish Referendum in 2009.   
                                                     
4 The rotating-presidencies of the European Council from 1 July 2008 to 31 June 2011 include: France, Czech 
Republic, Sweden, Spain, Belgium and Hungary 
5
  White & Case (2009) EuroBusiness (2009) 
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The Lisbon Treaty was ratified and came into effect on 1 December 2009. It was the fifth 
amendment to the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the culmination of years of negotiation to provide 
greater integration and institutional reform for the European Union. One of the most significant 
changes to come out of the Lisbon Treaty was the appointment of a more permanent, elected 
President of the European Council and the High Representative. Although this potentially increased 
the ability of the EU to speak with one voice and with greater continuity, it has the potential to 
significantly reduce the powers of the rotating presidencies of the Council of the European Union 
(henceforth referred to as the rotating-presidency) and hence the Member States ability to influence 
the direction of the EU. 
Article 15 (2) & Article 18 of the Lisbon Treaty articulate the creation of the position of an elected 
President of the European Council (forthwith referred to as the elected-President) and a High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy(HR). However, the exact role 
of the job was not clearly articulated in the text
6
 and was left to the Swedish Presidency to 
negotiate the responsibilities and the appointment of the inaugural HR and elected-President. 
The Lisbon Treaty changed the procedure by which acts are adopted, delegated and implemented.  
This constitutes a significant part of the EU’s activities with regard to regulatory output.  Although 
much of this work is technical and as Vos pointed out “ it is in many cases about very technical and 
detailed directives, but their nature often defines the exact implementation, strictness and concrete 
application under European law.  In this case, too, the Lisbon treaty provided the blueprint for 
future negotiations on the exact modalities…As from March 2011, the comitology procedures of 
old will be replaced by a completely new practice.
7”  Therefore it is not only interesting, but 
important to understand how these changes will effect evolution and how Member States and affect 
change. 
1.3.1 The rotating-Presidency 
Prior to 1 December 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty came into power, the Presidency of the Council 
of the EU (also known as the rotating-Presidency) was responsible for setting the agenda of 
legislative work for the coming six months within the EU and managing international security and 
international relations. In a post-Lisbon EU, this role falls to the elected-President of the European 
                                                     
6
 European Union (2008) full treaty text regarding the appointment of the elected-President and the HR. 
7
 Vos 2011:6 
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Council and the High Representative(HR); dissolving  the representative role of the rotating-
Presidency towards the outside world
8
.   
The rotating-Presidency of the Council of Ministers  has undergone significant changes as a result 
of the Lisbon Treaty—the European head of state currently holding the rotating-Presidency’s 
powers are now limited to presenting priorities to the European Parliament. “They still chair their 
national cabinets and in this function exercise oversight and in some cases straightforward control 
over the ministers who do act as president of a particular Council
9” 
Although the external role has limited the visibility of the rotating-Presidency and its role chairing 
meetings has been simplified, the demand for coordination between institutional actors adds a new 
organizational dimension to the role
10
. 
Solidified during the Belgian Presidency were the procedures
11
. With the stronger position of the 
European Parliament in the post the Lisbon configuration, “the parliament will have the last say on 
files relating to trade, agriculture and judicial cooperation.  This implies that a presiding country 
will have to increasingly take into account the susceptibilities of the parliament.
 12” In other words, 
rather than agreements being between Member States, the European Parliament will be actively 
involved in such deals. 
1.3.2 The elected-Presidency 
The newly created elected-President of the European Council presides over the work of the 
European Council. Currently held by Herman Van Rompuy, he invites and creates meetings, sets 
the agenda and chairs meetings.  The elected-Presidency assumes many of the agenda-setting 
powers as well as negotiation management tasks that were previously the domain of the rotating-
Presidency.   
As well as assuming a role as an additional member of the Council of the European Union, the 
elected-President also: 
• chairs and drives forward the work of the Council whilst endeavouring to facilitate consensus and 
cohesion; 
                                                     
8
 Vos 2011:4 
9 Batory & Puetter 2011:4 
10 Dreiskens, Van Hecke & Bursens 2010: 11 
11 European Council Decision 2009/882/EU adopting its Rules of Procedure, published in OJ L315/51 
12
 Vos 2011:5 
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• ensures the preparation and continuity of the work of the Council in cooperation with the 
President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council; 
• presents a report to the Parliament after each of the meetings of the Council; 
• ensures the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative)
13
 
Eighteen months after taking office Van Rompuy’s handling of the European Stability Mechanism 
as its chief coordinator and broker has made it clear that longer-term processes (such as the 
economic crisis) has proven the role’s potential to “better manage complex designs than a series of 
rotating presidencies would have been
14”. 
1.3.3 The High Representative 
The international security as well as the international and diplomatic relations tasks that were the 
responsibility of the rotating-Presidency prior to the Lisbon Treaty, now fall to the High 
Representative (HR).   
The HR is the EU representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
Common Security and Defence Policy(CSDP). The HR is also the President of the Foreign Affairs 
Council chairing meetings with European Member State Foreign Ministers once a month and is the 
President of the European Defence Agency responsible for the coordinated defence of the European 
Union. 
In addition to these roles the HR also participates in Council meetings, acts in the role of (ex-
officio) Vice President of the European Commission and is the Head of the External Action 
Service15. The HR also holds the position of Secretary-General of the Western European Union 
until the expiry of the Treaty of Brussels on 30th June 2011.  
However, the European Parliament (EP) is also more involved in this role than prior to the Lisbon 
Treaty, as the EP will have input into a large portion of the EEAS finances. Ministers of the EP 
(MEP) will have a say over a large portion of the service's finances, and must be informed in 
                                                     
13
 Chalmers, Davies & Monti 2010:Chapter 2  
14
 Romsics 2011:72 
15
 European External Action Service(EESA or EAS) is the diplomatic arm of the European Union operating EU 
delegations around the world. http://www.eeas.eu/what_we_do/index_en.htm  
14 
 
advance of any strategic policy changes. Additionally, at least 60% of the staff at the EEAS will be 
permanent EU officials rather than Member State diplomats.
16
 
2. Literature & Theoretical Review 
Previous research has clearly shown that the office of the rotating-Presidency has enabled Member 
States, regardless of their resources and power status within the EU, to enjoy elevated possibilities 
to pursue outcomes in the EU that are in-line with their own national interests. This is achieved 
through the office of the rotating-Presidency because as the chair, the Member State is the agenda-
setter, organizes negotiation procedures and has privileged access to negotiating parties information 
which allows them to guide negotiations to the most favourable outcome
17
. This is not to say that 
the chair always achieves its preferred outcome but that the chair has the potential to negotiate the 
best possible outcome due to its asymmetric power in comparison to the other negotiating actors.  
One definition of the role of the chairman states that its role is to transform the wealth of competing 
proposals into negotiable core texts, create structural negotiation conditions conductive for 
concessions, encourage parties to unveil their bottom lines in confidential talks, and discover issue-
linkages and engineer package agreements
18
.   
In the case of the rotating-presidencies, Bengtsson et al. (2004) Tallberg (2006), Verhoeff and 
Niemann(2011), Thompson(2008), Kollman(2003)  and Elgström (2003) have demonstrated how 
Member States have used the role of the rotating-Presidency to set agendas and negotiate outcomes 
through negotiation management that are directly favourable to their own national interests. Bunse 
(2009) added to this body of research by demonstrating that the role of the chair provides 
asymmetric power far beyond a Member State’s pre-existing demonstrated capabilities by outlining 
how smaller EU Member States had unprecedented political power whilst in the rotating-
Presidency role.  
2.1 EU Integration: institutionalism, policy networks and actors 
Although this thesis focuses on the ability of actors (Member-States) within the Council of the 
European Union to effect change in a new institutional environment, it is important to understand 
the schools of thought that have guided much of the EU integration research.  
                                                     
16
 EurActiv – 22 June 2010 Spanish Presidency seals EEAS deal. http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/spanish-
presidency-seals-eeas-deal-news-495455 
17
 Tallberg 2006:230 
18
 Talberg 2006:231 
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Understanding the European Union as a supranational government organisation has been the object 
of study since the 1970’s. Understanding of the Council of the European Union (hence forth 
referred to as the Council) and its predecessor the Council of Ministers, has often been a side 
reference for the competing claims of neoliberal institutionalists such as Keohane, liberal 
intergovernmental rationalists like Moravcsik or neo-functionalist policy network theorists such as 
Haas
19
.  
Although Bunse’s work does look at policy networks, it tends more towards a New Institutionalist 
perspective on EU integration as it considers the impact and constraining effects of the 
institutions
20
. Whereas leadership and negotiation academics like Elgström, Tallberg, O’Naullin et 
al. have a greater preference for Liberal Intergovernmentalism—where rational Member State 
actors behave according to relative power positions and expected gains
21
.  As this thesis examines 
the behaviour of rational Member State actors within the context of changing institutional 
structures, it has a shared theoretical position between New Institutionalism and Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism—a position which is not uncommon in the existing EU integration literature.  
2.1.1 New Institutionalism 
Simply put, New Institutionalism (NI) attempts to explain political actors and outcomes within the 
context of the institutions that define and constrain actor behaviours. It is the idea that institutions 
have an impact on the type and characteristics of political debate and outcomes. “Rather than being 
simple and passive vessels within which politics occurs, institutions provide contexts where actors 
can conduct a relatively higher proportion of positive sum bargains.
22”  
However, it is not uncommon for NI theorists observing EU integration to still observe the primacy 
of Member State nationalism which is a particular claim of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI).  
Under the umbrella of NI is the idea of policy networks and actor-based models as an attempt to 
depict the “highly segmented nature of EU decision-making in which advice, consultation expertise 
and technocratic rationality are the means used to cope with the regulatory thicket of day-to-day 
decision-making.
23” NI explains the continuity of decision-making despite the changes in actors 
and political ideology preferences.  
                                                     
19
 Rosamond 2000: 124-125, 154, 142 & Moravcsik 1998:497 
20
 Bunse 2009:6 
21
 Tallberg 2006:235-236 
22
 Rosamund 2000:114 
23
 Rosamund 2000:123 
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New Institutionalism is particularly relevant to this thesis as the institution of the rotating-
Presidency has changed, therefore it is possible to extrapolate that it is indeed the change in 
institutional structure that enables and constrains actors—impacting on the policy networks and 
actor-behaviours.  
2.1.2  Liberal Intergovernmentalism  
Liberal Intergovermentalism(LI) in the context of EU research, is a grand theory designed to 
explain EU integration through the observation of actor-centred behaviour. LI is concerned with the 
ways that national governments as “emissaries of national interest interact when placed in the 
institutional confines of the EU”24. Central to the concept of intergovernmentalism is the idea of the 
primacy of the nation-state, that it is the actor rather than the governing institutions that determine 
behaviours and outcomes. In the context of the EU, this actor-centred model is clearly visible in the 
position of the rotating-Presidency of the Council of the EU as legislative agenda-setters. 
Institution-building within the EU is explained by LI as a deliberate act of nation states and 
national elites to develop social and economic interdependences with other nation states for their 
own (and mutual) benefit
25
.  
The Lisbon Treaty, seen from the intergovernmental perspective would therefore be a series of 
negotiations that resulted in a Treaty that was a crucial juncture in institutional development that 
defines how nation states relate to each other through strategic bargaining.  
There is a distinct core belief in Intergovernmentalism of liberalism and rationalism where actor 
interaction is based on the concept of self-interest where “rational state policy-making involves 
minimising risk and maximising benefit
26”. In the context of this thesis the rotating-presidencies 
can be seen as pursuing outcomes that most benefit their social and economic positions in an effort 
to maximize benefit and neutralise potential risks.  
2.2 Definition of national interest 
The one subject that binds all of these theories discussed above is the belief that political actors 
pursue national interests or positions that are most favourable to the nation state in question. 
National interest has been defined as emerging from “domestic political conflict as societal groups 
                                                     
24
 Rosamund 2000:152-153 
25
 Rosamund 2000:130 
26
 Rosamund 2000:132 
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compete for political influence, national and transnational coalitions form and new policy 
alternatives are recognized by governments.
27”  
Previous literature has also highlighted that national interest is a key determining factor in the 
bahaviour of actors in the political arena stating that: 
“a pattern of underlying national preferences, not the distribution of power resources or 
institutionalized information, is the most fundamental determinant of state behaviour in world 
politics
28.”  
Given that the Council is a policy community
29
 demonstrating a high degree of inter-dependency 
on other actors to achieve their ends, it is safe to assume that the Council as an institution partly 
defines the rules of engagement and acts as a constraining factor for rampant pursuit of national 
interests. But more importantly, there is an element of self-censoring because as Bunse (2009) 
highlights, accommodating others interests benefits a Member State in the long run and “what 
happens when a country is no longer holding the presidency weighs heavily on its calculations”30.   
2.3 Chairmanship: theories of leadership 
If the aim the thesis is to assess the ability of Member States to pursue national interests in 
a post-Lisbon environment there must first be an understanding of the role of leadership of 
the Council and its position as the chair in negotiations. Previous research has highlighted 
that the Chair has access to privileged information, and that the institution of the rotating-
Presidency can explain the conditions by which these formal leaders are likely to influence 
outcomes in multilateral bargaining.
31
 However, to date, there is no literature on the role of 
the chair in a post-Lisbon environment or its potential repercussions. 
Game Theory is commonly used to understand how multiple-players interact and 
determine outcomes. However Game Theory has limitations in that exists on the premise 
that all the players are rational and equal, and that they have complete knowledge of the 
                                                     
27
 Moravcsik 1993:481 
28 Moravcsik 1998:497 
29 The most stable forms of policy network is said to be the policy community. Here actors are bound together 
in a series of relations of dependency (i.e. actorA needs X from actorB and actorB needs Y from actorA) and 
networks remain impenetrable to outside actors. Pg.124 Rosamond, B. (2000) 
30
 Bunse 2009:214 
31
 Tallberg 2006:5 
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preference and payoffs of all parties
32
. In contrast, political leadership and negotiation 
research concludes that revealing true preference can be both risky and non-tactical
33
 only 
specific information is revealed by players during negotiations and the chair is privy to the 
preferences and limitations of all the players as a way of determining areas for consensus. 
This provides the chair with asymmetric power over the negotiations due to the enhanced 
informational resources they have at their disposal
34
. 
Research into the effect of political leadership within negotiation processes and 
procedures, has been limited. This area of study has been referred to as “under-researched 
and under theorized
35” by Simone Bunse and by Jonas Tallberg(2006) as in need of 
revision “if it is to properly explain the outcomes of multi-lateral negotiations…with an 
understanding that conventional wisdom must be supplemented with an understanding of 
the power wielded by formal leaders
36”.  
What Tallberg refers to as, a need for a reassessment of conventional wisdom, is the 
preconceived idea that formal political leadership is constrained by the institution of the 
chair and that there is a general expectation of neutrality and impartiality
37
 in its provision 
of leadership, mediation, and avoidance of negotiation failure. Building on this idea of the 
presidency as an agenda-setter with powers to influence and guide negotiation outcomes, 
others, such as Wurzel (2004) have concluded that “the Presidency holder must find a 
balance between acting as an honest broker while also showing some initiative in driving 
forward the negotiation process. The Presidency therefore has agenda-shaping rather than 
agenda-setting powers.
38”  
Due to the lack of volume in the research and understanding as to the political power of the 
EU rotating-presidency, there is almost unlimited scope for exploration. For a Master’s 
thesis this is both a blessing and a curse, as this allows significant room for maneuvering 
                                                     
32
 Young 1975 Bargaining: formal theories of negotiation University of Illinois Press, 1975 
33
 Tallberg 2006:25 
34
 Tallberg 2006: 29-31 
35
 Bunse 2009:2 
36
 Tallberg 2006:238 
37
 Elgström 2006:172 
38 Wurzel 2004:29 
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but also makes it difficult to be precise and address a particular issue with reference to 
existing knowledge and research.   
O’Naullin (1985) examined the effect of ten Presidencies between 1973 and 1983 on 
national administrations but stopped short of addressing the issue of the ability of the 
presidency to lead and influence outcomes.  
It is particularly difficult to quantify the influence of the Council Presidency as its 
negotiations occur almost entirely behind closed doors. Therefore, the study of the effect of 
the chair is limited to outcomes that coincide with the national preferences of the Member 
State holding the Presidency. Tallberg(2006) illustrated the power of the chair by defining a 
link between outcomes and national preferences, however, in a post-Lisbon European 
Union, it is yet to be seen if the Member States have the ability to achieve outcomes that 
are in concert with national interests. Other recent research has also indicated that the ideal 
of the Presidency as a neutral element is not congruent with actual outcomes and that the 
concept of a strong constraining norm of neutrality does not exist
39
 or is under question
40
.   
A criticism one can level at almost all the previous research into leadership and negotiation 
in the European Union is that researchers have tended to cherry-pick their way through the 
history of the European Union and selected examples that suit the theory that the chair is 
more than an unbiased, mediating role aiming to achieve an outcome. Therefore, this 
research attempts to observe a set period of time observing each presidency equally to 
assess if they pursued national interests. 
Previous research also has a tendency to select particular policy outcomes by certain 
Member States—Tallberg (2006) examines six rotating presidencies (Germany, France, 
Sweden and Denmark) between 1999 and 2003 to confirm his theory of achieving 
outcomes congruent with national preferences. However, this may not indicate that 
Presidencies always achieve favourable outcomes or that the outcomes could have more 
factors such as availability, interest-level of other actors in the issue, visibility, impact 
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(economic or social), or even an individual leader’s charisma and presence on the global 
scene. 
On the other hand, Bunse (2009) observes three smaller states (Finland, Belgium and 
Greece) and concludes that despite their relatively weaker power position within the EU 
their power is augmented by the institution of the Presidency and their ability to act as 
agenda-setters. Bunse concludes that the Member State holding the Council Presidency had 
a unique comparative advantage to push specific issues and solutions and increase an 
issues’ visibility,  as well as increase the intensity of debate around an issue—because they 
can exploit procedural powers and informational advantages
41
. 
Studying the changing role of the chair (in this case the Presidency of the Council of the 
EU) in negotiations gives an understanding of the conferred asymmetrical powers that they 
otherwise may not have had access
42
. It also provides a broader understanding of the 
potential impacts that changes to this institution will and are bringing with it. 
Traditionally, leadership in the form of chairing negotiations has been understood from the 
perspective of a process within institutional theory or outcomes explained by game-theory 
and rational actor negotiation where the chair is another negotiator equal (due to the belief 
that they act as neutral mediators) alongside other negotiating parties. 
Typically, research into the presidency and its role as a chairperson within negotiations is 
discussed from the perspective of institutionalism and new institutionalism with the 
Presidency viewed from a policy entrepreneur perspective. Rational choice institutionalism 
is also a common theme of researchers when studying the impact of the rotating-
presidency, as actors with well-defined preferences will aim to achieve outcomes that are 
in-line with their preferences. 
Bunse (2009) indicates that the rotating-Presidency as a policy entrepreneur
43
 explains the 
nature and influence of the position well whilst also conveying the subtleties of its 
influence, bias and informal powers.  She finds that the rotating-presidencies of Finland, 
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Greece and Belgium put them in a position to strongly influence foreign policy decisions. 
Bunse’s findings are inconclusive with regard to a clear-cut definition of the casual 
variables that could explain policy outcomes, as she finds that with the ability to influence 
outcomes, presidencies must also adopt a consensus position that is central to the Council 
of the European Union’s institutional framework44.  
Tallberg (2006) also views the rotating-presidency from the perspective of rational 
institutionalism as “the extent to which negotiation chairs succeed in shifting distributional 
outcomes is their own favour is conditioned by the institutional environment in which they 
operate.
45”  
The research of Elgström (2001, 2003),Gray and Stubb (2001), Metcalfe (1998), Bunse 
(2000, 2009), Thomson (2008), Tallberg (2000, 2004, 2006, 2008) and Kollman (2003) all 
highlight the importance of the institution in not only providing the framework from which 
presidencies can achieve outcomes but also the constraining effect of the institution of the 
European Council on the presidencies. Post-Lisbon Treaty research such as Kaczynski & 
Byrne (2011) has focused on the areas for cooperation between the rotating & elected 
presidencies and assessing the success of these changes
46
. All of which point to the 
question at hand—what happens when the institutional framework changes and how does 
this influence the ability of the rotating presidencies to achieve outcomes congruent with 
its national interests? 
The consequences of the Lisbon Treaty changes have clear ramifications on the ability of Member 
States to pursue outcomes that are in line with national interest at an EU-Level.  Tallberg 
highlighted that the structure of the role of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (prior to the 
Lisbon Treaty) enabled Member States to act as the chair in negotiations within the European 
Union and significantly contributed to outcomes via agenda management, agenda control and 
negotiation management.  The access to privileged information about other nations made the 
rotating-Presidency an opportunity for Member States to steer outcomes that would be in-line with 
national preferences. He went as far to predict that the Member States would never agree to the 
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creation of a permanent presidency because the role was so influential
47
. The thesis therefore will 
examine if the current rotating-Presidency can still agenda-set, and manage negotiations to achieve 
outcomes that are favourable to their own interests. 
2.3.1 Leadership and Negotiation in a changing environment 
This research aims to contribute to the body of knowledge about leadership and constellations of 
influence within the European Union by observing a unique turning point in history—the creation 
of the elected-Presidency and the High Representative. How these changes will affect the Member 
States ability to control and shape the future evolution of the EU will become more apparent as 
time goes on, however, by studying this period of change in the institution of the rotating-
Presidency is a unique opportunity to fill a clear and demonstrated gap in knowledge about the 
changes in institutional framework as a factor that can impact on legislative outcomes.  
On the whole, this thesis aims to observe these potential changes as a result of the evolution of the 
institution of the Presidency of the Council of the EU by observing the changes in legislative and 
policy outcomes against the backdrop of their specific national interests.  
Secondly, this research aims to observe if there are any obvious constellations of power that could 
enhance the outcomes of rotating-presidencies post-Lisbon. The reason for this secondary aim is 
that in the first trio-presidency after Lisbon, Belgium held both the permanent-Presidency and the 
rotating-Presidency simultaneously and therefore it will be interesting to see if this could have any 
impact.  
Research into the area of policy communities would suggest that actors rather than policy 
communities have an interdependence
48
  that could allow for specific constellations of power 
whereby Actor A actively pursues Y in an effort to illicit Actor B’s support for X. There could also 
be more obvious constellations of power around national commonality—which is the case with the 
Belgium who happened to hold the rotating-Presidency between 1 July and December 31 of 2010 
whilst also holding the elected-Presidency from 1 December 2009. 
3. Methodology 
At this point in time, the first trio-presidency after the Lisbon Treaty has come to a close and it is 
possible to examine how, or if, the institutional changes that have occurred in the Council’s 
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structure could have impacted on the decision-making possibilities of the rotating-presidencies in 
their new role. Therefore, it seems perspicuous to pursue a case study comparison between the last 
trio-presidencies
49
 with the first trio-presidencies to observe the potential pursuit of national 
interest outcomes and observe if there are any changes in the legislative action of the council 
during this period.  
By examining the last trio presidency before the Lisbon Treaty changes, the study can establish a 
base-line of presidencies’ behaviors and compare it to the following trio-presidencies to establish 
changes in trends, patterns of policy behavior and outcomes.  
3.1 Documentation data sampling 
As Marshall & Rossman indicate “qualitative sampling usually requires a flexible, pragmatic 
approach
50”. This is particularly appropriate as discussions within the Council of the European 
Union are held behind closed doors and there is little primary source data. Therefore, the bulk of 
the data sample is of a qualitative nature from secondary sources.  
The data under scrutiny will include a qualitative text analysis from various sources including 
speeches and public comment given during the various presidencies, publicly available documents 
such as press releases, interviews and press articles as well as political commentary and academic 
analysis.  These will divided into each term of office of the rotating-presidencies from 1 July 2008 
until 31 June 2011. The reason for this background analysis is to define the national interests and as 
Moravcsik points out “an understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement 
to, the analysis of strategic interaction among states.”51  
 Observing a wide variety of sources provides a richer descriptive element to the case study and 
provides an all-encompassing method that is especially suited to technically distinctive situations 
(such as the change in rotating-presidency roles) but that have more variables of interest than data 
points
52
. 
Bias is a particular issue for this research as it relies on secondary source material. It is important to 
critically examine the source and ask what are their motivations for writing this article, who are 
they writing for and are they attempting to convince the audience of the value of their argument. 
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Loseke (2008) highlights some considerations when dealing with claims-makers
53
. This term fits 
political analysts, as although they are analysts and often academics it is uncertain if they have 
objective interests. There must also be consideration of the hierarchy of claims-makers as often the 
political analysts are political science academics and they are “at the top of the hierarchy of 
credibility
54”. Therefore, by varying sources the research attempts to avoid repeating claims or 
perspectives from a single source.  
Therefore, by noting the commonalities in observations and reported actions of the rotating-
Presidencies from various perspectives, I will be able to sample data events and reduce the 
potential for the bias of the text creeping into this research paper. 
As a result, the text for consideration is from a variety of political analysis organisations such as 
CEPS, SIEPS and Notre Europe, the Centre for Global Development, EU-27 Watch, the Institute 
for European Politics as well as the European Commission, the rotating-Presidency public website 
information, press releases and journalistic articles. By deeply engaging in the literature available 
there is a conscious attempt to combine a broad range of secondary source literature together with 
the previous research to avoid guiding the research
55
 and allow trends and patterns of comment to 
emerge with regard to a rotating-Presidency’s national interest, or economic benefit as a result of 
programmes and legislation.  
3.2 Statistical data sampling 
In addition to a qualitative analysis, I will review new legislation that came into force during the 
period of office of each presidency. The reason for the legislative review is two-fold. Firstly, the 
quantitative data could support the qualitative data, providing impartial supporting evidence in the 
form of simplified counting of legislation during the presidencies. Secondly, it will be interesting to 
note if Bunse’s conclusion that the short rotating-presidency term was potentially responsible for a 
level of legislative vigour
56
.  Thus, this data could provide supporting evidence for the claim that 
the asymmetric power of the rotating-Presidencies has the power to influence what is discussed, 
negotiated and in some cases legislated.   
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3.3 Analytical approach  
This research attempts to use as many of the sources and blends qualitative methods with simple 
quantitative counting of legislation as a way to avoid distortions that might create bias in the 
research and subsequent analysis
57
.  Although much of the research into the Presidencies of the EU 
are on the whole qualitative, the addition of quantitative data can be “particularly helpful in the 
generation of an intensive, detailed examination of a case.
58” Schout& Vanhoonacker highlight that 
there is often a simplified calculation, or counting, of the legislation that has passed during a 
specific period of office
59
.  
As previously discussed the majority of negotiations within the Council are held behind closed 
doors, making the analysis of first-hand accounts difficult to obtain. It is therefore appropriate to 
conduct a comparative case study analysis using an abductive approach. As there is a combination 
of existing theory that provides a prior analytical framework from which it is possible to observe 
the cases before and after the Lisbon Treaty enactment and thus draw inferences about that theory 
that are either consistent or inconsistent with the theory
60
. 
As the primary data sampled during the three year period are the outcomes of legislation, the issues 
under discussion and the analysis of the presidencies concerned. The qualitative data is secondary 
source and will be subject to a comparative and critical qualitative text analysis of the 
documentation (political analyses, press releases, articles etc.) to determine trends in attitudes, 
behaviours and outcomes that define national interest and a presidency’s efforts to attain results.  
The analysis procedure in this thesis will be presented in a three step manner: 
1. Qualitative text analysis to determine national interests for further analysis. 
2. A review of legislative records to ascertain and discuss the variations in legislative 
originating from the Council. 
3. Comparative case study analysis 
3.4 Critical, qualitative comparative case study.  
The case study chosen can be described as a comparative critical analysis between the last trio-
presidency before the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty to the first trio-presidency post-Lisbon. 
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Therefore this thesis research fulfills a certain level of subject or case density which would enable 
the research to fulfill a sense of validity and provide generalisability.  
As a comparative case study it reflects a level of complexity in data that would be useful, as well as 
contributing to the body of knowledge within the field of leadership and political science. “Implicit 
in most social science notions of case analysis is the idea that the objects of investigation are 
similar enough and separate enough to permit them as comparable instance of the same general 
phenomenon”.61 In the case of the trio-presidencies they are similar enough in time-frame, structure 
and political power to be comparable on their own. With the dependent variable of the Lisbon 
Treaty institutional changes, the comparison of the two trio presidencies represents a natural 
experiment worthy of comparison.  
A true natural experiment would observe the same presidencies under each set of rules, however, 
with 27 Member States, the rotation is not close enough to allow comparison in the given time 
frame. Plus it is almost impossible to recreate the same circumstances (with the same or similar 
political environment, knowledge/experience levels within the EU etc.). That being said the two 
trio-presidencies have similar constitutions with one large long-standing member of the EU (France 
and Spain), a second longer-term member smaller state (Sweden and Belgium) and a third CEE 
Member State (Czech Republic and Hungary).  
Although this research aims not to compare the successes and failures of presidencies, it instead 
observes and compares if or how each presidency could achieve national interests in the given 
institutional environment of the specific time period. 
3.5 Analysis methods 
By utilizing the secondary-source documentation and the legislative record, this research combines 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. The analysis of the secondary-source documentation would 
pursue a general qualitative text analysis, relying on the instances of correlation between stated 
national interests and negotiated outcomes as reported in publicly available documentation and 
political analysis. In essence this analysis looks to uncover behavior and explain outcomes through 
explanation building through causal links
62
 in this evaluative case.  
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3.5.1 Qualitative Text Analysis 
To assess the ability of the rotating-presidency to achieve national preferences this thesis must 
investigate the policies pursued by the Member State and their priorities and attempt to match the 
issue to economic benefit, political benefit or long-standing country-based preference. 
As the priorities of the trio-presidencies are defined in a collaborative process to ensure a longer 
term consistency over an eighteen-month period, the three Member States attempt to define 
common areas of interest. However, how they each achieve these objectives and their interpretation 
of the common programme of work is individual. 
Additionally, there can be exceptional circumstances where the Member State may follow a course 
of action to answer a crisis that allows them a unique opportunity to pursue a national interest. 
Therefore, to complete this qualitative text analysis required the definition of benefit that could be 
derived from any of the published priorities, programmes or crises where the presidencies chose to involve 
themselves.   
After reviewing the published priorities and examining academic analysis and comment to define 
the areas of involvement, there was a need to pursue a course of deductive reasoning to search for 
information that could link involvement with a direct financial, political or personal benefit.  
In the case of the Czech Republic, there was a requirement to search for information about energy 
reliance and energy provision. By understanding the background information one can understand 
the actions taken by the Presidency. In the case of France, there was a requirement to look at 
reports on election promises made by Sarkozy which explained why a traditionally “brown”(non-
environmentally focused) Member State was now actively promoting “green” (environmental) 
issues. 
In the end, the qualitative text analysis relied on a variety of sources beyond an academic review 
and a review of European Union documentation with supporting evidence from a press search as 
well as issue-specific deductive research to locate evidence that revealed potential benefits 
(interests) or alternatively honest broker behaviours. In summary, how each Presidency was 
deductively examined was reliant on the priorities pursued.   
3.5.2 Legislative Data as supporting evidence 
The second step in the process of analysis is to assess the origin of legislation (decisions, 
regulations and directives) to determine if the reduction in the supply of formal leadership, in the 
28 
 
form of the rotating-Presidency, has had any effect of the amount of legislation originating from the 
Council.  
Although this process could be described as a quantitative analysis as it contains figures from the 
legislative data, it is difficult to assign the term quantitative analysis to this section of the “analysis” 
as there will be no correlative or any other type of quantitative analysis of the figures. The analysis 
is to simply record the amount of legislation of the specific rotating-Presidency in question. 
Therefore, it is probably more correct to call this analysis supporting numeric evidence than 
quantitative analysis.  
3.5.3 Deductive analysis and conclusions 
The final step in the analysis is reviewing the data collected from the perspective of achievement of 
national interests. Observing trends in type of priorities pursued and legislative record between pre- 
and post-Lisbon Treaty presidencies would support or disprove the asymmetric-power leadership 
theories and potentially reveal how institutional changes impact national interest outcomes and 
policy-entrepreneurship by Member States.  
3.6 Issues of quality & validity 
There are inherent issues when studying an institution like the Council of the European Union—
firstly is the difficulty in studying the process of negotiations that are confidential, the second is 
attributing outcomes to other actors with differing levels of influence and power. 
To counteract the issues of the quality of the data, it is therefore important to rely on more than one 
source of data and compare and check between the data to assess the validity of the data and to find 
correlation between sources
63
. 
There is also the question of bias—it would be impossible to suggest that any researcher is not 
biased by the current thinking and attitudes towards an area of study. In this case, current literature 
on the council presidency has an underlying negative tone towards the idea that the role of the chair 
has the ability and the track record of influencing outcomes in favour of national interests. 
However, it could be argued that as democratically elected individuals, Member State 
representatives are elected to act in the interests of the people who elected them.  
The exception to the literature is Bunse (2009) who positively highlights that the six-month 
rotating-presidency national interest pursuit may provide variety, legislative vigour and enthusiasm 
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that could be lost with the introduction of a permanent president of the Council of the European 
Union
64
.  
As a way of combating the potential influence of singular sources, the research will cover a specific 
period of time between July 2008 and June 2011 and examine each of the presidencies using a 
variety of similar data sources.  
As the negotiations are behind closed doors much of the information about the presidencies comes 
from political commentary about the term of office. For this reason I have decided to use political 
analysis from reputable academic sources such as the Scandinavian Institute of European Politics, 
the Centre for European Policy Studies in conjunction with the European Union’s own analysis of 
the presidencies as well as other analyses. By uncovering correlative opinions and attitudes to the 
various presidencies from more than one source it becomes possible to draw conclusions and 
deduct the validity of the question posed in this thesis. 
As Becker points out, the position of the well socialized researcher is to immediately assume “that 
any tale told by at the top intrinsically deserves to be regarded as the most credible account 
obtainable.
65” On this point, the fact that there is little direct source data from the Presidencies, it is 
difficult to access any of the tales told by political elites. However, it is just as appropriate to be 
critical when using the political analysis documentation as the researchers may be subjective and as 
Becker points out position (the university elite) is not always an indicator of impartiality. 
3.6.1 Validity of case study research 
Flyvberg (2009) observes that conventional academic attitudes are often against case study research 
as it is often believed that academic knowledge could not possibly be generated from a single case. 
However, as previously indicated, this is not a single case study but a comparison between two trio 
presidencies—three pre-Lisbon and three post-Lisbon presidencies. 
This research builds on the previous case study research of Tallberg (2006) and Bunse (2009) and 
could be interpreted as secondary documentation/data analysis
66
, as the thesis attempts to use 
similar methods and sources as previous researchers. This thesis research also attempts to apply a 
more scientific comparison between two distinct periods of institutional structure. Rather than 
“cherry-picking” through a rotating-Presidency’s legislative outcomes, this work attempts to 
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observe the rotating-Presidencies as a whole and evaluate their legislative contribution during this 
time period.  
3.6.2 Generalisability  
Although many European academics believe that the EU is a unique experiment, there are elements 
of this study which can impact how we study leadership within a political system. Leadership is a 
ubiquitous feature of politics and by definition is an “asymmetrical relationship of influence in 
which one actor guides or directs the behavior of others towards a certain goal over a certain period 
of time
67.”  
The two types of leadership (formal and informal) within political systems are vital in 
understanding negotiations and outcomes. Whereas formal leadership is where a group confers 
powers to an individual or institution via a position of authority, informal leadership can be enacted 
by any resource-endowed actor with power
68
. In this particular study, the examination of formal 
leadership structures and constellations can have direct implications for our understanding of the 
asymmetric power exerted by formal leadership institutions regardless of the individual’s informal 
power level.  
This study examines if the restructuring of the rotating-presidency and the introduction of a 
permanent President of the Council will have implications on the formal powers of the rotating-
presidencies. However, this study can be directly translatable to other political systems as 
restructuring political power is not a European-only situation, it is universal in nature.  
Leadership is an almost universal concept within any organizational structure and could in turn 
have potential application in areas beyond the political sphere. For example, Bunse’s hypothesises 
that the rotating-presidencies despite being, or even because they are exceedingly short, provide the 
impetus for the presidency-holder to do as much as possible within the timeframe given—resulting 
in a legislative fervor
69
.  If this study indeed confirms that the amount of legislative activity has 
subsided, it could have significant implications for explaining political outcomes. 
4. THE PRESIDENCIES 
The following sections 5 to 10 provide an overview of the presidencies in context of the priorities 
presented and the legislative and policy agreements achieved as reported by political elites, close 
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commentators, political science academic papers and the media. These following sections attempt 
to present each Presidency as a broad overview to attempt to find linkages between priorities 
pursued and national interest and thereby identify and compare any changes in the ability of 
Presidencies to pursue national interests due to the institutional changes in the format of the 
rotating-presidency.  
Each section concludes with a summary table of issues and a table indicating the legislative record 
of the Council, the Council & EP and Commission during the term of office of the rotating-
Presidency. The summary table attempts to provide a snapshot of the issues and highlight the 
connections between the priorities and actions of the rotating-presidency with national interest 
congruency and outcomes, such as policy, legislation or changes in issue awareness (introduction 
of a new issues or heightened action of an issue within the EU). 
5.  The French Presidency  
5.1 The energetic presidency 
The French rotating-Presidency of the Council of the EU (forthwith referred to as the French 
Presidency) was characterised as “energetic” 70 by EU, media and political commentators alike. The 
“hyperactive”71 Sarkozy was called a “force of nature, rather than a conventional leader72” by ex-
Prime Minister of Great Britain Tony Blair. During the French Presidency, Sarkozy chaired more 
EU summits than any other President in the Council’s history73.  However, even though Sarkozy’s 
style of leadership was a significant departure from previous presidencies, he was considered 
Napoleoinic
74
 the French Presidency continued to push for and support the traditional positions 
within the European political sphere with continued focus on the Common Agricultural Programme 
(CAP) and reduction in Value Added Tax (VAT) on restaurants.
75
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The programme of work for the French Presidency was also hyperactive with four planned areas of 
engagement:  energy and climate change, European defence, immigration and the future of the 
CAP.  It was stated openly by commentators that France was actively pursuing national interests, 
there were a “number of areas where Paris seemed to be using the presidency to pursue its national 
aims
76.” The SIEPS interim report commented that the six-month presidency agenda was “carefully 
selected by the French Government (to be) in-line with the European agenda but also with national 
interests.
77”  
5.2 Priorities and national preferences 
5.2.1 The Mediterranean Union 
As well as this extensive programme of work, an unofficial fifth priority should also be included: 
Sarkozy’s attempted Union of the Mediterranean78. The French Presidency began with its frenetic 
pace of work with a summit for the creation of the Mediterranean Union whose membership would 
include only those nations bordering the Mediterranean.  
 
The Mediterranean Union, which was similar in content to the existing Barcelona Process, was at 
best seen as an attempt to reinvigorate this process and at worst,  a way for France to secure 
hegemony over the region
79
.  That the Barcelona Process was too bureaucratic was conceded by 
Germany’s President Angela Merkel however, there was also very little interest in the project from 
other European Member States bordering the Mediterranean such as Spain, Italy and Greece and in 
the end the revamped Barcelona process
80
 and the Mediterranean Union was created
81
 with its own 
Secretariate in Barcelona.
82
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5.2.2 Asylum & Immigration 
The first priority, immigration and asylum, can be directly connected to internal political interests 
of France. The rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front party resulted in an attempt by Sarkozy 
to win-over these voters over to during his presidential election campaign with hard-line positions 
on immigration with a specific focus on integration. Therefore, this focus can be seen as Sarkozy 
continuing this line of argument on a higher level of government
83. However, it is Sarkozy’s 
background as Home Affairs Minister that would have given him a comprehensive understanding 
of the issues and the other Member States’ positions on this issue. SEIPS believe that this explains 
the willingness of the French Presidency to negotiate on this issue, however, an alternative 
explanation could be that Sarkozy deliberately wanted to move this issue away from the national 
political arena and effectively neutralize LePen within French domestic politics. Either way the 
issue relates directly to national interest. 
As a result, the French Presidency initiated the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. It has 
five areas of commitment and clearly defines the difference between irregular migration(refugee 
and asylum seekers) and legal migration (relating to competency migration and family migration)
84
.  
Unsurprisingly the pact also has a particular focus on integration of an immigrant to the host 
country—a theme that was present in Sarkozy’s presidential campaign. Importantly the pact also 
highlights the need to control numbers with the right of the host country to force repatriation of 
migrant workers when they are no longer required.  
The third area of commitment highlights the need for coordinated and effective border controls and 
strengthens the position of the Frontex which was established in 2004.  
The fourth area of commitment was an effort to construct minimum standards for the recognition of 
the validity of asylum-seekers within the European Union. Even though steps were taken to 
establish a single system for processing refugee application, it was far from the initial centralized 
organization for the assessment of asylum-seekers that France had hoped for.  
The final area of commitment within the pact was to promote the creation and strengthening of 
political ties with migration-origin countries to foster social and economic stability.  
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5.2.3 Climate Change & Energy 
Climate change was a significant issue during Sarkozy’s presidential election campaign. In 
addition, there was pressure as to how the European climate package would calculate the three 20% 
objectives by 2020, as well as the global political community as the commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol drew to a close.  
The challenge faced by the French Presidency was to navigate this issue in a period of financial 
crisis and attain a cohesive EU position on climate change from the Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) EU Member States. Notably, the Czech Republic, who would hold the presidency after the 
French, were particularly vocal in their economic concerns of the climate package and could have 
potentially unraveled any work completed by the French Presidency if they felt that their concerns 
were not being met
85
.  
On one hand Sarkozy was insistent that energy and climate were an absolute priority due to the 
position taken during his presidential campaign
86
, on the other hand, the climate package was 
increasingly perceived as potentially damaging to economic growth in a time of a financial crisis 
87
.   
The French government is not traditionally one of the “green” Member States of the European 
Union due to strong industrial interests in France
88
. Traditionally, the Scandinavian Member States 
and Germany are the “green” states in the European Union. 
Sarkozy and France were making strong comments and publicly stating their environmental stance 
above national interests: 
“If you, government representatives, don’t defend your countries’ interests, no one will 
do it in your place. But if we all stick to defensive positions protecting our countries’ 
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parochial interests, however legitimate these may be, what will this lead to, in the end? 
To disaster
89” 
However, although on the surface combating climate change seems contrary to defending Europe 
from the economic crisis, Sarkozy commented that―”We need to impose a carbon tax at 
[Europe‘s] borders. I will lead that battle”90 Sarkozy’s position was also echoed by Nobel-prize 
winning trade economist, Paul Krugman who stated that carbon taxes at the border are ―”a matter 
of leveling the playing field, not protectionism”91. This argument would have gone a long way to 
mollifying the economic concerns of the CEE Member States.  
In the end, Sarkozy refused to back down on the 20 percent reduction in CO2-equivalent
92
 
emissions by 2020. Even with concessions to provide free emission quotas for some industry 
sectors particularly exposed to international competition, a review clause in the following year and 
allowing Member States to have autonomy over how the revenues of the Emission Trading Scheme 
(ETS) were spent—the outcome was inconclusive93.  
The climate change compromise reached by the EU in December of 2008 was generally praised by 
political observers as paving the way for a strong EU position in Copenhagen at the 15
th
 
Conference of the Parties (COP-15) round of climate talks.  
However, the “success” of the French Presidency in this area may have been less related to national 
interest and more closely tied to a combined need of the EU Member States to create a position in 
the lead up to post-Kyoto talks at the COP-15.
94
  
5.2.4 The Common Agricultural Programme (CAP) 
France is the largest Member State recipient of money from the Common Agricultural Programme 
(CAP) as shown below in Diagram 1. The CAP accounts for 40 percent of European Union budget 
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expenditure
95
&
96
 of which the health check of the CAP was designed to review if the CAP was 
achieving its policy goals. This next phase of CAP reform is scheduled to take place in 2013. This 
issue is an issue is of significant importance to France and has been traditionally strongly defended 
by France, however, according to the SIEPS interim report on the French Presidency, France 
wished to appear more flexible than previous Governments: “after years of autism under Chirac, 
France may be open to dialogue… however, it was clear to everyone that placing the CAP among 
the priorities of the Presidency was a way for France to defend its traditional position.
97” 
Diagram 1: Distribution of CAP expenditures across EU countries in 2009 
 
Source: European Commission(2011). 
Despite France’s softened position on the CAP did it attempt to leverage their privileged position as 
chairman in these discussions to stave off potential threats or erosion of their 20% share of the CAP 
budget. Wallace & Wallace (2008) concluded that the enormous financial outlays of the CAP make 
it difficult for Member States to reform the CAP as it endangers a significant revenue stream and 
“has now become an essential element in brokering deals necessary for policy reform outside of 
agriculture.
98” It could be therefore concluded that the French Presidency succeeded in limiting 
reform to the CAP and preserving its position. 
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5.2.5 European Defence 
The French presidency was clearly pushing for a more coordinated approach by the EU on military 
issues and Sarkozy had stated a preference for full integration for France into all aspects of NATO. 
However, significant progress in this area was overshadowed by crises such as the Russian-
Georgian war and the financial crisis. 
5.3 Overview table and legislative record 
Table 1: Overview of priorities  
Priority Area 
Congruent with National 
Interests 
Resulted in 
legislation 
Resulted in  
favourable          
policy changes/ 
stability* 
Resulted in 
increased issue 
awareness  
Mediterranean 
Union 
Yes - Fulfills economic 
rational actor behaviour no yes no 
Asylum & 
immigration 
Yes - Fulfills domestic 
electoral sensitivities no yes possibly 
Climate Change 
Yes - Fulfills domestic 
election promises yes yes possibly 
Energy 
Yes  - Preserves the nuclear 
industry no no* yes 
CAP 
Yes - Attempts to preserve 
existing funding levels no no* no 
 
Table 2: Legislative action from the Council & the European Parliament 
during the French Presidency 
 
Regulations Directives Decisions 
 
Council 16 111 125 
Council & EP 36 37 5 
 
6.  The Czech Presidency 
6.1 Preparations for the Presidency – followed by Crisis 
The Czech Presidency was surrounded by wary expectation as it was the first time the Czech 
Republic had held the position and there was feeling of uncertainty as to whether the Czech 
38 
 
Republic was sufficiently capable of dealing with the huge diplomatic and administrative task of 
the role.
99
 These opinions were centered on the Czech Republic’s relative newness to the European 
Union and its lack of experience in comparison to older Member States but also due to fact that the 
President of the Czech Republic was an open EU-skeptic
100&101
 and that the Czech Republic had a 
relatively short history of democratic-rule after the fall of communism. However, concern was 
primarily centred around the Czech Republic’s political instability after the 2006 elections, which 
resulted in a loose coalition of parties with a shaky political mandate.  
An example of how this internal political instability affected the Czech Presidency could be seen as 
early as 2006. The preparations for the EU presidency started in 2005, however, these plans were 
put on hold as the outcome of the 2006 Czech general election produced no clear majority 
government. The result was a period of stalemate until the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), 
Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) and the Greens (SZ) could not establish a three-party coalition 
government without the support of two deputies from the Social Democrats (CSSD) 
102
, who in turn 
specifically demanded that the sitting coalition government would ratify the Lisbon Treaty by the 
end of February.  During the Czech rotating-Presidency, ODS’s Vaclav Klaus held the Presidency 
of the Czech Republic—an open EU-skeptic103, he was opposed to ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty
104
.  
In the end, Topolanek held the EU Presidency for three months before a vote of no confidence in 
the House of Deputies toppled the government—requiring his eventual resignation in early May. 
Although Vaclav Klaus may have had ambitions to sit as President of the EU Council, it never 
eventuated and the remaining two months were handled by a caretaker government with Jan 
Fischer filling the role of the rotating-Presidency. 
In the lead up to the Presidency the Czech Republic issued their priorities, which after internal 
review identifying where the Czech Republic could add-value were reduced from five priority 
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areas to three, focusing on a liberal trade agenda and security
105
. The three priorities (also known as 
the 3E’s) were: 
 Energy & Climate Change 
 Trade liberalization & improved regulation 
 Open and Secure Europe 
Although, these aims were congruent with the Swedish Presidency’s position on eastern 
enlargement, liberalization of internal markets & trade and better regulation; the trio-presidency 
found little in common with the French Presidency was against further liberalization of internal 
markets in a time of financial crisis
106
. 
Given that the French Presidency had concluded discussions on the CAP reform and on energy-
climate package, the Czech Republic was left with trade liberalization. In the face of the global 
economic crisis, the agenda was narrowed to combating the global financial crisis and maintain 
trade liberalization in the face of French protectionism.
107
  
In the end the Czech agenda became known as the 3 E’s – Energy, Economy and Europe in the 
World. 
6.2 Crises, policies and priorities of the Czech Republic 
6.2.1  The Gazprom Crisis  
Although the energy-climate package had been put to bed by the French in the previous Presidency, 
the Gazprom Crisis in early January of 2009 put the focus for much of the next six-months on 
resolving the crisis between Russia and the Ukraine and securing energy supply for the EU 
Member States
108
 to the detriment of other issues
109
.  
Due to a dispute between Russia and the Ukraine over gas flow inconsistencies, Russian energy 
giant Gazprom halted supply of natural gas to Europe. This resulted in the intervention of the EU 
and Topolanek’s Czech Presidency were centre-stage to mediate a solution that would allow 
resumption of gas services to Europe. On this point, the general opinion is that the Czech 
Republic’s diplomatic handling of their Eastern neighbours was exemplary and roundly praised. 
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This allowed the Czech Government to open the door on unresolved issues of the climate package 
decided during the French Presidency. 
The crisis was followed by a seminar on a common energy security policy, an issue that the Czech 
Government had articulated as a priority prior to entering the presidency office. 
6.2.2 Economic Crisis  
The Czech Presidency had anticipated the management of discussions around the single market and 
better regulation however, the global financial and economic crisis was a continuing concern into 
the Czech Presidency and, unsurprisingly, consumed much of the work of the Presidency during its 
term of office. As one of the shock-therapy transition economies of the CEE region, the Czech 
position is decidedly liberal and therefore it is unsurprising that it actively worked against any 
protectionist proposals such as those suggested by Sarkozy to repatriate investment and jobs back 
to French industry 
110&111
.  
The original economic focus of the presidency was to encourage the free movement of goods and 
services within the EU and enlarge free-trade to include neighbouring countries. However, with the 
continued financial and economic crisis, encouragement shifted to maintenance of the trade status 
quo. 
The US was requesting that Europe invest hundreds of billions of Euro into the economy, a move 
supported by Germany and the UK but rejected by Topolanek as “the road to hell”112. Although, 
this outburst by Topolanek may have been perceived as unhelpful
113
, it clearly pitted the power of 
the Czech Presidency against protectionist suggestions from Member State heavy-weights UK, 
France and Germany. 
To this end the Czech Presidency organized a summit culminating in Member State agreement to 
not pursue protectionist domestic policies. This clearly demonstrates the power of the chairing role 
of the Presidency to set the agenda and influence the outcome of meetings.  
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Although the Czech Republic were not the only Member State against protectionist policies, their 
clear voice throughout the debate on the economic policies to be put in place to combat the 
economic and financial crisis and their swift action to set up extra economic summits on the issue 
demonstrate a link between the position of the presidency and their ability to manage negotiations 
that result in outcomes that are favourable to the chair-holder. 
6.2.3 Energy Security 
Moravcsik wrote about national interest that it emerge(s) “through domestic political conflict as 
societal groups compete for political influence, national and transnational coalitions form and new 
policy alternatives are recognized by governments… Through this process emerges the set of 
national interests or goals that states bring to international negotiations
114
. In the case of the Czech 
Republic, the competing internal forces make it difficult to define the national interests. It then 
even more difficult to ascertain if the Czech Republic could achieve these aims due to the fact that 
the domestically-troubled ODS coalition was dissolved and replaced by a caretaker Presidency led 
by Jan Fischer. 
Moravscik highlights an important point that, without domestic stability and competing positions 
within a country’s domestic politics, there is little possibility for a coherent set of national interests 
or goals. However, there is general consensus on the position of the Czech Republic on issues such 
as their pro-US stance and wariness of the EU as an Eastern-Bloc substitute.  
The pursuit of a common energy policy for Europe is also in strong alignment with Czech national 
interests as it is heavily reliant on coal for its energy needs (59% of energy production is from solid 
fuels
115
). Therefore, further caps and reduction of CO2-e negatively impact on the Czech 
Republic’s largest electricity producers. The climate-energy deal concluded by the French 
Presidency contains a weak compromise that, according to political commentators, was a relief as 
the Green Party (SZ) and the Civic Democrats(ODS)  had opposing positions that could have 
potentially lead to greater unrest on the domestic political front
116
. 
Table 3: Energy Mix in the Czech Republic  
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Source: Czech Republic Energy Source Fact Sheet 117 
Although the Czech Republic is one of the lowest importers of energy fuels (relying almost entirely 
on domestic coal and nuclear energy provision see Table 1 above), it does import gas and oil from 
Russia
118
. With emission reduction targets in place, the Czech Government will need to look to 
energy supply from lower emitting sources than its domestically-supplied brown-coal. Therefore, 
the Nabucco pipeline would allow supply of gas from other regions, effectively ending the Russian 
monopoly of supply to the Visegrad region; and, provide other energy options.  
Another reason for the Czech Republic strongly pushing the Nabucco pipeline and a stronger 
stance on energy security is the historically tense relationship between Russia and the Czech 
Republic. As a pre-20
th
 century natural ally, the relationship with Russia soured during the Eastern 
Bloc era but has returned to cool-normalcy after the fall of communism and although today is 
perceived less of a threat
119
. Russian-Czech relations are often described as pragmatic, neither 
hawk (hostile) or dove (placating)
120. Therefore, Russia’s actions during the Gazprom crisis could 
have been interpreted as a throw-back to communist control by Czech politicians and would have 
most likely promoted a sense of urgency around a single energy policy for the EU that would 
deliver a reduced reliance on Russia as a supplier of energy. 
The pursuit of a common energy policy is therefore clearly in-line with national and regional 
interests. Through the Czech Presidency the Nabucco pipeline gained visibility and the issue of 
energy security.   
6.2.4 Europe in the World - Eastern Partnership 
The third priority of the Czech Republic presidency was the Eastern Partnership, which strongly 
resonated with the foreign policy priorities of the Czech Republic and is “aligned with the Czech 
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idea of a liberal, economically open Europe
121.” The Russian government consider the Eastern 
Partnership as strongly “anti-Russian122” and this partnership in conjunction with the gas crisis 
negotiations and the Georgia Crisis are indicative of the Czech’s pragmatic and dual relationship 
with Russia. 
It seems obvious to conclude that more open borders with the Czech Republic’s nearest neighbours 
would be of direct financial benefit to their economy and therefore would constitute the pursuit of 
national interests. Although, it is important to assess if they would have been the only Member 
State to pursue this line—and the answer is no as Sweden, Finland of course the other CEE 
Member States of Romania, Poland and Hungary are supportive of strengthening the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).  
As the French Presidency had opened the debate around the situation with neighbouring states with 
the Union of the Mediterranean, the Czech Presidency could build on the idea of greater openness 
and avoid opposition from the larger and more powerful Member States not positively positioned to 
the idea.
123
 
Again, the interrupted nature of the Czech Presidency stalled a concerted effort in this area and it is 
difficult to judge how the position of the chair would have influenced outcomes in this area.  
It is interesting to note that, unlike the French Union of the Mediterranean, the Czech initiatives 
around the Eastern Partnership were strongly couched in the ENP. This could be a result of the 
Commission and Barosso’s swift action to curtail the 2008 US-Czech Republic negotiations for 
preferential visa deals for Czech citizens in return for tougher restrictions
124
.  Alternatively, the 
Czech’s could have simply learnt the lesson of the previous Presidency that successful initiatives 
still require the agreement of the EU Member States. 
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6.3 Overview table and legislative record 
Table 4:Overview of actions and policies during the Czech Presidency 
Priority 
Area/Action 
Congruent with National Interests 
Resulted in 
legislation 
Resulted in  
favourable          
changes/ 
stability 
Resulted in 
increased 
issue 
awareness  
Energy 
Security 
Yes -  
1)Preserved dependency on existing 
domestic energy sources 
2) Neutralized Russian position and 
negotiated from a position of power No Yes Yes 
Europe in 
the World Yes -  Clear regional preference for CEE No Yes Yes 
Economy Yes - Halted national Member State 
protectionism No 
 
Yes n/a 
Table 5: Legislative action from the Council & the European Parliament 
during the Czech Presidency 
 
Regulations Directives Decisions 
 
Council 146 24 158 
Council & EP 5 7 30 
 
7. The Swedish Presidency 
As the last presidency of the final trio before the Lisbon Treaty changes, Sweden’s Presidency was 
going to have a full agenda managing the transition. Given that that there was also an incoming 
Commission and EP were the newly elected, it was even busier. Add to this an ongoing 
international economic crisis and the Copenhagen climate talks to determine a post-Kyoto 
commitments, it is unsurprising that the Swedish Presidency had little time to pursue an agenda 
according to their national interests.  
Analysts have described the style of the Swedish Presidency as pragmatic
125
 and during the term of 
office of the Presidency the initial list of six priorities shrank. In a speech by Fredric Reinfeldt 
towards the end of the Presidency he admitted that “the climate and the financial crisis are the main 
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priorities of the Swedish Presidency.”126  This is not to say that other priorities were not present but 
that circumstances overtook the direction and ability of the Presidency to guide results to their own 
advantage.  
Given that one of the primary responsibilities of the Swedish Presidency was to organise the details 
of the institutional changes in preparation for enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, 
The published programme of work for the Swedish Presidency stated six priorities: 
1. Economy & Employment 
2. Climate 
3. Justice and Home Affairs  - The Stockholm Programme 
4. The Baltic Sea Strategy 
5. EU, the neighbourhood and the world 
6. Preparation for Lisbon Treaty changes 
In the lead up to the Presidency the Swedish preparations were planned under both the Nice Treaty 
and the Lisbon Treaty rules
127
.  However between 2006(when preparations began) and 2009, 
significant changes in on the economic stability had taken place. Europe and the world were 
continuing to suffer a recession due to the global financial crisis. The Swedes, like the Czechs, 
support a more liberal approach to the economic crisis, a position that encourages tight fiscal 
management by containing ballooning debt and balanced national budgets to manage debt.  
7.1 Swedish presidency priorities and policies 
7.1.1  Economy & Employment 
The draft upcoming programme of then pending trio-presidency of France, the Czech Republic and 
Sweden stated that: “Particular priority will therefore be given to the comprehensive reassessment 
of EU spending and resources, as agreed in December 2005
128”. In an assessment of the Swedish 
Presidency from the Czech perspective it was stated that “the liberal centre-right constellation of 
both Czech and Swedish Government made it easier to share the vision of the importance of 
preserving the benefits of an internal market and ruling out calls for new protectionism.
129” 
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7.1.2 Climate 
Climate issues aside, the Swedish Presidency didn’t have time to pursue other environmental issues 
during their term in office and in this particular priority “the Presidency priorities were almost 
preordained
130”. In the lead up to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) 
15
th
 Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen (COP-15), there was an attempt to reach agreement 
so that  Europe could enter the negotiations with one voice. As the French Presidency had already 
reached agreement on the levels of reductions of CO2-e, the Swedish Presidency was responsible 
for hammering out a deal to determine how the EU would financially assist poorer nations with 
climate change issues. In this respect, the Swedes were sympathetic to the emerging economies of 
the CEE and didn’t force the point, which ultimately lead to a failure to reach agreement.  
Reaching agreement and allowing the EU to speak with one voice at the COP-15 was difficult not 
only from an internal perspective but also externally. This inability for the EU to act as one voice 
and one representative could be seen at COP-15, where the US president Barack Obama gathered 
the European Leaders to broker an agreement. A picture taken at the COP-15 shows the US 
President gathered with the heads of state from Germany (Angela Merkel), France (Nicolas 
Sarkozy) and the UK (Gordon Brown), as well as, the President of the EU Commission José 
Manuel Barroso, the sitting EU Council President Fredric Reinfeldt
131—demonstrating that the US 
recognized that EU’s ability to negotiate a deal required the three largest EU heads of state to also 
be present.   
7.1.3  Justice and Home Affairs - The Stockholm Programme 
The Stockholm Programme took off where the Hague Programme (2004-2009) left off, dealing 
with issues of justice and cooperation on matter of civil and criminal matters, free movement of 
people, asylum and migration as well as security.  
The Swedish position on issues of asylum and migration are considered “liberal132”, although the 
text was agreed in December 2009, the action plan was not finalized and fell to the next presidency 
period. 
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7.1.4  The Baltic Sea Strategy 
Each of the members of the trio presidency have pursued neighbourhood or regional policy. France 
with the Mediterranean Union, Czech Republic attempted to expand the Eastern Partnership and 
Sweden pursued the Baltic Sea Strategy.  The Baltic Strategy is not simply about trade but also 
addressed issues of the environment, economy, infrastructure and security and differs from 
previous ENPs by implementing a new transnational-governance level for the EU with countries 
outside the EU
133
.  
The more macro-regional focus of the Swedish Presidency reflects the fasting growing and larger 
trading partners as shown in Table 6 below. However, it is important to note that some of the fastest 
growing trading partners are neighbouring countries to Sweden and Russia is Sweden’s 11th largest 
trading partner, which makes the Eastern Partnership and the Baltic Sea Strategy clearly congruent 
with national interests.  
Table 6: Top Swedish Trading Partners by value and growth
 
Source: SCB http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart____142266.aspx 
The figures in Table 6 above show the top ten Swedish trading partners followed by the fastest 
growing trading partners who are neighbouring the EU. Note that Russia is actually the 11th largest 
trading partner for Sweden and with a growth in trade of 23% between 2010 and 2011.  
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At the time of writing this thesis only a handful of initiatives have resulted from the Baltic Sea 
Strategy: BalticDEAL – to reduce agricultural nutrient emissions; BALTADAPT – climate change 
adaptation programme; Innoship – Ship wreckage removal and clean-up; CleanShip – standard for 
clean and safe shipping operations; Ecovilliages: promoting sustainable rural living
134
, however 
there are continuing issues around funding and coordination
135
.  
7.1.5  EU, the neighbourhood and the world 
Although Sweden is known to support the process of enlargement to include Turkey and Iceland, 
its actions is this area were decidedly low-key. Sweden did support the application and although it 
didn’t fast-track Iceland into the EU it did consider that it had a shorter track136.  
Accession talks were held with Turkey in December 2009 to discuss progress on the issue of EU-
Membership and the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey
. &137
 
At the conclusion of Swedish Presidency there was little movement on the issue of enlargement and 
on the whole this priority received little attention and little action.
 
7.1.6 Lisbon Treaty preparations 
The main achievement of the Swedish Presidency was finalizing and implementing the Lisbon 
Treaty. The role of the Swedish Presidency in negotiating the Czech ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty was roundly perceived as vital to the facilitation of Klaus actually signing the Treaty. 
Potentially the negotiations could have opened up another round of discussions or veto from other 
Member States, all of which was deftly handled by Reinfeldt
138139
. In the end the full ratification by 
all the EU Member States enabled the Swedish Presidency to focus on negotiating the job 
descriptions and finding candidates to fill the role of HR and elected-President. 
The job descriptions of these two roles were considered a blank slate with senior diplomats stating 
that never before had “such a prestigious and influential position been established with the detail, 
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role and powers left so vague.
140” In fact, the Swedish Presidency was criticized for its closed-door 
and non-transparent negotiations by announcing the selected candidates before the job description 
had been revealed. However, there is little to suggest that Sweden gained anything directly from 
these negotiations. 
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7.2 Overview table and legislative record 
Table 7: Overview of policies and actions during the Swedish Presidency 
Priority Area Congruent with National Interests 
Resulted in 
legislation 
Resulted in            
policy 
changes 
Resulted in 
increased issue 
awareness  
Economy & 
employment 
Yes -Preserved non-protectionist 
position No No n/a 
Climate Yes – but not influential No No No 
Stockholm 
Programme 
Yes Rational actor behavior with 
clear economic benefit No Yes Yes 
Baltic Sea 
Strategy 
Yes 
rational actor behavior with clear 
economic benefit No Yes Yes 
Lisbon Treaty 
Preparations No Yes Yes n/a 
Table 8: Legislative action from the Council & the European Parliament 
during the Swedish Presidency 
 
Regulations Directives Decisions 
 
Council 87 14 159 
Council & EP 62 58 13 
 
8. The Spanish Presidency 
8.1 The invisible presidency  
As the first rotating-presidency after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, this presidency was 
bound to have some teething issues. There were comments in the press and by political observers 
that Zaptero found that no longer having a high profile role to play as the external face of the EU 
“hard to swallow141”. Although it had been clear communicated that the focus of the Spanish 
Presidency would be on implementing the details of the Lisbon Treaty and providing a smooth 
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transition for the new presidency and HR roles
142
, there were areas of confusion with regard to 
external representation of the EU which resulted in Obama not coming to a summit in Madrid.  
According to political commentators, “Prime Minister Zapatero did not want Van Rompuy to take 
his place in the international spotlight.  That was why he invited US President Obama to Madrid 
and wanted to organise the reception himself.  He failed in his ambition and Obama did not come to 
Europe in the first half of the year.
143”  From the American side, PJ Crowley, the US Assistant 
Secretary of State said, “because of the changes involving the establishment of an EU Council 
President and a European Commission President on top of the rotating EU Presidency, I think it's 
taking some time to work through exactly how various high-level meetings will happen.
 144”  
Regardless of how each side perceived the incident it was clear it was embarrassing for the EU as 
the Lisbon Treaty was meant to streamline and simplify external relations. 
The Spanish Presidency stated four priorities around the Innovating Europe theme to firstly reduce 
the EU’s energy dependency with the creation of an energy common market (an idea first floated 
by the Czech Presidency) and secondly to promote e-commerce among Member States by creating 
a digital internal market to increase productivity and e-commerce. The third priority revolved 
around making industry more sustainable and establishing an electric car project. The final priority 
was to improve universities in an effort to “invest in research and education to enable Europe to 
become a leading player.
145” These priorities reflected the 2020 Strategy launched during the 
Spanish Presidency at were the focus of the trio presidency (Spain-Belgium-Hungary - SBH). The 
2020 Strategy was aimed at boosting world-competitiveness in Europe with five objectives centred 
around employment, innovation, education social inclusion and climate/energy. However, the 2020 
Strategy was not launched until late March 2010, half-way through the Spanish term of office. 
Amongst the priorities above, the Spanish Presidency also had responsibility for defining the 
procedures and processes of the EAS, implementing the citizen’s legislative initiative, furthering 
work on gender violence issues, hosting the Latin America summit and pursuing the Mediterranean 
Union. 
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However, the criticism leveled at the Spanish Presidency was that the priorities were overly grand 
and diffuse, making “it was difficult to discern the core policy priorities146.” Secondly, it was felt 
the Spanish Presidency would be unable to tackle such ambitious targets due to its lack of resources 
(less than half the staff of 90 fielded by Sweden in 2009), and a budget of €55 million (only a third 
of the budget spent by the French presidency in 2008).
147
 The issues of credibility were further 
brought into question when hackers replaced the image of Zapatero with the fictional image of Mr. 
Bean
148
. Maybe as a consequence of this, the Spanish presidency website is no longer available 
making it difficult to access much of the information about the daily events of the Presidency.  
8.2 Spanish presidency priorities and policies 
8.2.1 Implementing the Lisbon Treaty 
The Spanish Presidency yielded results in the area of implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Summits in Madrid and Brussels lead to clearing understanding of the roles of the HR, the Elected 
and rotating presidencies. Even in the last weeks of the Spanish presidency the details of the EEAS 
were put to bed.149 
This trio set the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty as one of the highest priorities along with 
economic coordination to combat the effect of the financial crisis. However, it should be noted here 
that the Lisbon Treaty doesn’t always provide exact dates for implementing specific changes and 
the voting system for the Council of the European Union under the Lisbon Treaty uses a 
proportionality system weighting the voting system on population figures. Under the Treaty of Nice 
the votes are less proportional giving Germany 29 votes for a population of 82 million; whereas 
Spain with a population of only 46 million gets 27 votes
150
. It was determined that this change 
could be delayed until 2014. Although this is primarily due to Polish demands, this area of 
negotiation hasn’t been pursued by Spain.  
8.2.2 Economic coordination – 2020 Strategy 
The Spanish Presidency continued the work of previous presidencies and proposed greater 
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coordination of national economic policies including incentives and sanctions to bind Member 
States to common economic policies.
151
 
During their term in office Spain had an unemployment rate of almost 20% (19.3% in Spain) 
152
 
which was twice the average rate of the EU Member States (9.3%) during the same period
153
. 
Domestically, Spain’s deficit had expanded dramatically to 11.4% of GDP last year154. During the 
presentation of the priorities to the EP the French MEP Daul questioned Zapatero’s economic 
governance and structural reforms by saying that  "I am not too sure whether you and your political 
family have realized whether your proposals are realistic.
155
" MEP Daul was referring to the 
Spanish deficit to which Zapatero responded that Spain would “get back on track” and deliver 
budgets within the 3% deficit range by 2012 by reining in public expenditure. However there were 
fears that the financial crisis in Greece would spill over to Spain
156
.  
It is therefore unsurprising that the first meeting of the economic reform task force was held in late 
May 2010 towards the end of the Spanish Presidency and was headed by Herman Van Rompuy 
President of the European Council.  
The Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union may have been “handicapped to 
some extent by his country’s wobbly financial situation,157” However, Zapatero did use his political 
presence in the EU to highlight the differences between Greece and Spain and divert attention away 
from potential domestic economic instability
158
. 
8.2.3 Climate/Energy  
Brundtland report defined human sustainability “development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
159” The EU 2020 
strategy defined in the previous trio-presidency of France-Czech Republic-Sweden. However, 
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Spain has a natural interest in pursuing policies promoting sustainable energy industries. Not only 
is Spain highly dependent on energy imports, they also have the most progressive renewable and 
solar energy legislation and building codes that goes “far beyond the minimal level of 
implementation of the EC Directive on the Energy
160” Buildings are obliged to cover 30-70% of 
domestic hot water provision through solar energy.  
8.2.4  Cohesion Policy and CAP 
On the issues relating to the reform of cohesion policy and the CAP, Spain steadfastly support the 
continuation of these policies without alteration until 2012. In a Committee of the Regions (CoR) 
document the Spanish Presidency clearly stated the “The CoR's position will continue to rest on 
three main planks: rejection of any form of re-nationalisation; the need to adapt industry and 
employment to the challenges of a more sustainable development model; and the use of multilevel 
governance and an approach that is more targeted to the region concerned and to intra-regional 
disparities
161”  
Spain’s steadfast support can be clearly linked to its long history of support from the EU due to the 
Cohesion Funds. Between 1995 and 2007 Cohesion Funds built 1200km of new roads, extended 
rail-links by 850km, 370000 people receive support as part of self-employment social/economic 
activities and delivered around 6 billion Euros of investment into R&D and innovation projects in 
Spain
162
.  Additionally, the CAP provides over 7billion in funds and as the third largest recipient of 
CAP money in the EU.
163
 All of which provide strong incentives to maintain the CAP and the 
Cohesion Policy for as long as possible. 
8.2.5  Strengthening Foreign Policy & the Mediterranean Union 
 As “this region(the Mediterranean) is a top priority in Spain’s foreign and European policies. Due 
to the geographical proximity and a wide range of links between Spain and the southern 
Mediterranean countries, this is an area where Spanish interests are at stake.
164” It was surprising 
that little was achieved in this area during  the Spanish Presidency.  
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Conversely, in the area of relations with Latin America and the Caribbean the Spanish Presidency 
convened a summit to build the EU’s relations with these regions. The summit, held in May 2010 
highlighted the strategic relations with the Andean Community, Central America and EU-
CARIFORUM. These regions have not previously held very high priority in EU foreign policies
165
, 
however, they have a long history of involvement with Spain. 
8.2.6 Strengthening Social & Citizen agendas 
The reasons for Spanish interest in this priority is due in part to the Euro-positive stance of Spain. 
Spain has pursued a strong Europeanisation of justice and internal affairs policies since the 1990s. 
However, there are other reasons for this position by Spain which are rooted in high levels of 
immigration (legal and illegal) and terrorist activities. To this end the Spanish Presidency was 
pushing to join the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights of 1950.  
It is also interesting to note that the Spanish Presidency was strongly pushing the social elements of 
the 2020 Strategy. This position is less surprising when taking into consideration the domestic 
political situation of Spain—with Zapatero’s socialist government due for reelection in 2012 and 
their domestic stringent fiscal measures, pursuing a social inclusion and integration at an EU level 
could fulfill many election promises without placing demands on domestic finances. 
8.2.7  European Citizen’s Initiative 
The implementation of the European Citizen’s Initiative is aimed at increasing participation of the 
general public in EU processes and is an attempt to engage the public in EU issues. As a strongly 
pro-EU country, Spain was keen to launch this initiative however, it was left to the Belgian’s to 
finalise. 
8.2.8 Gender-based violence 
According to Amnesty International, 70 women were killed in Spain in 2008 by their partner or 
former-partner; of these women 34 were foreign nationals
166
. In an effort to provide more legal 
powers to protect women in situations of domestic violence as well as protection the rights of 
individuals regardless of gender in the workplace, the Spanish Presidency put forward draft 
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legislation on this issue in March 2010. However, finalizing the legislation within the timeframe of 
the Spanish Presidency was difficult due to technical legal issues
167
. 
8.2.9 The Stockholm Programme 
Immigration is an important issue for Spain. Spain is the primary beneficiary of Frontex and EU 
immigration related funds, receiving €87 Million between 2007-2008168  As a high volume of 
illegal immigration from Africa enter the EU through Spain illegally, this issue represents a 
significant national interest for Spain and the provision of continuing funds. 
The Stockholm Programme attempts to create a common and organised way of handling 
immigration within the EU, however, this is not its only aim. The Programme also looks at ways to 
combat and control human trafficking and terrorism. This last section is particularly important to 
Spain and its relationship to the Basque separatists, as well as the Al Qaida train bombing in 2004.  
8.3 Overview table and legislative record 
Table 8: Overview of actions and policies during the Spanish Presidency 
Priority/Action  Congruent with National Interests 
Resulted in 
legislation 
Resulted in            
policy changes 
Resulted in 
increased 
issue 
awareness  
Gender-based 
anti-violence 
Yes – strong domestic political 
awareness and action No No Yes 
Stockholm 
Programme - 
Immigration 
Yes – Continued financial support 
for illegal/immigration issues No Yes Possibly  
Priority/Action  Congruent with National Interests 
Resulted in 
legislation 
Resulted in            
policy changes 
Resulted in 
increased 
issue 
awareness  
CAP 
Yes – preserving CAP payments and 
support through lack of CAP reform 
action No No No 
2020-Social 
agenda 
Yes – strongly congruent with social 
policies of Zapatero Government No No Possibly 
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Table 9: Legislative action originating from the Council during the 
Spanish Presidency 
 
Regulations Directives Decisions 
 
Council 48 8 151 
Council & EP 34 17 15 
 
9. The Belgian Presidency 
9.1 A cooperative compromise 
In the lead up to the Presidency, the sitting Government of Belgium under the Prime Minister Yves 
Leterme, fell due to a lack of agreement in the coalition exacerbated by domestic division between 
the Wallonian and Flemish regions. A caretaker Government assumed the role of the Presidency for 
the entire term of office. Although the media was initially skeptical of the success or ability of a 
caretaker Government to fulfill the role of the rotating-presidency, the Belgian Presidency was 
successful in achieving the programme of work on almost all fronts. This prompted commentators 
to suggest that “the lack of Government was a determinant factor for success169”, as the Belgian 
Presidency was administrative and diplomatic rather than politically driven and could devote time 
to the EU rather than domestic issues
170
.  
It is also important to note that even though Belgium is one of the smaller Member States, as a 
founder-member it has an extensive history of involvement and a wealth of experience in dealing 
with the EU. Secondly, it has a certain home advantage of being the host nation of the de facto 
capital of the European Union. In addition, the first elect-President of the European Council was 
also Belgian and had been heavily involved in preparation for the Belgian Presidency before 
assuming the role of elected President.  
In an interview Bernard Bulke, representative for the caretaker government, stated that the Belgian 
Presidency saw its role as an “honest broker” supporting the process of greater EU integration and 
implementing the Lisbon Treaty
171
. However, did all these factors enable the Belgian Presidency to 
achieve outcomes that were congruent with their national interests? 
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9.2 Priorities and policies pursued  
The priorities of the Belgian Presidency although closely in-line with the Spanish and Hungarian 
presidencies can be defined within five focus areas: Socio-economic, social, environmental, 
internal security and external action. Many of these issues were shaped by the situation demands 
such as the ongoing financial crisis. Other focus areas were a result of continuing the work of 
previous initiatives such as the Stockholm Programme on the common migration issues. There is 
also an additional focus area for the Belgian Presidency which was to implement as much of the 
Lisbon Treaty as possible.  
9.2.1 Socio-economic – tackling the economy 
The Belgian presidency reached significant decisions through trilogue discussions
172
 resulting in 
reforms for the regulation and control of financial sector and pensions through risk analysis. During 
the Belgian Presidency, the Council also passed a decision on the 20 December 2010 amending 
Decision 2010/320/EU with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance gave notice to 
Greece to implement deficit reduction measures to remedy excessive deficit levels. 
One of the successes of this presidency was the introduction of financial watchdogs and industry 
regulation. However, “the European supervision of the financial sector did not go as far as was 
originally aspired to (and demanded by the European Parliament), but it is an improvement 
compared to the present situation.
173” However, under the Belgian term of office four European 
watchdogs for the banks, insurers,  stocks and market supervision as well as a committee in charge 
of tracking and avoiding systemic risk. 
With relation to “other agreements relating to the crisis in the euro zone had already been reached 
or initiated by the European Council, led by Herman Van Rompuy.  In many cases, however, they 
had to be given concrete shape under the Belgian presidency
174”.  
9.2.2 Patents 
One of the failures of the Belgian Presidency was their inability to reach consensus on a common 
European patent system.  
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The Belgian Presidency worked during its term in office to secure agreement on a common 
European Patent. Although the Belgian’s put forward a compromise that limited the translations of 
the copyright information into English, French and German, it was unacceptable to Spain and Italy 
and the Belgian Presidency was forced to suggest a “reinforced cooperation procedure”175. 
In 2009, the Pirate Party won two seats in the European Party elections
176.The Pirate Party’s 
manifesto is clearly anti-copyright with a particular emphasis on electronic media and IT copyright 
laws
177
.   In 2010, the Belgian Pirate Party won less than a quarter of a percent (0.23%) of the 
federal Belgian election in 2010 and only fielded candidates in the central Brussels arrondissement 
of Brussels-Halles-Vilvoorde. However, even this small voter catchment could represent a fast-
growing and potential threat to established groups, in a fragmented political environment such as 
Belgium’s. Therefore, with growing voter interest in this issue it may have become popular with the 
pubic to address and popular with traditional political parties to put to rest and neutralise at a 
domestic level. 
To say that this issue was solely a Belgian issue would be exaggerating the issue. The Pirate Party, 
founded in Sweden in 2006, have had a meteoric rise in almost every country in Europe, 
representing a dilution of traditional parties voting bases. Secondly, copyright is an expensive
178
 
and lengthy procedure—streamlining that procedure and providing a pan European patent coverage 
would significantly reduce costs for new inventions ot just in Belgium but in all the EU Member 
States. As a result it is difficult to determine if this constitutes national interest or a shared interests. 
Regardless, the patent issue was not resolved during the period of the Belgian presidency. 
9.2.3 Bail-out mechanisms 
With regard to the permanent bail-out mechanism, Belgium had to put aside its national preferences 
and act as an honest broker. The bail-out mechanism, is a directly applicable Council Regulation 
407/2010 under Article 122 of the TFEU, was pushed heavily by France and Greece in response to 
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Ireland defaulting on loans. However, at the conclusion of the Belgian Presidency the financial 
crisis and debt crisis, especially Ireland
179
 and Greece, were ongoing issues. 
9.2.4  Social focus – unemployment & citizens initiatives 
During the Belgian Presidency the social aspect of the work programme was heavily focused on 
employment and the 2020 Strategy designed to encourage workforce participation for women, 
youth, older workers and low-skilled workers with a heavy emphasis on better integration for legal 
migrants. The 2020 Strategy also places a particular emphasis on green jobs. 
It is unsurprising that the Belgian Presidency had little resistance in this area as the financial crisis 
had become a European economic crisis and employment rates were a concern
180
. Spain had 
already made headway in this area and Belgium completed the work.  
Beyond employment issues, other social issues handled during the Belgian Presidency workshops, 
seminars and conferences included gender equality, poverty alleviation, pension scheme, 
environment and health workshops. However, these appear to be legacy or housekeeping issues. 
“The Lisbon treaty brought other novelties to be further shaped under the Belgian presidency.  
There is the Citizens’ Initiative, for instance: one million citizens can place an item on the 
European Commission’s agenda.  The exact modalities of collecting the signatures and testing the 
admissibility were defined under the Belgian presidency, despite numerous initial differences 
between the commission, the European Parliament and the Member States.
181” 
9.2.5  Environmental focus 
During the Belgian Presidency Joke Schauviliege, Flemish Minister for Environment presided over 
the Environment Council with four priorities on the environment agenda: sustainable materials 
management; the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in Nagoya; the COP16 meeting of 
UNFCCC in Cancun and reform of the EU environmental policy instruments
182
.  Although progress 
was made in these negotiations there were no significant decisions. 
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9.2.6 Internal security focus – finalising the Stockholm Programme 
The work begun during the Swedish Presidency was a focus area for the Belgian Presidency. This 
issue can be seen as important for the Belgians as the Groen! and Ecolo environmental parties are 
strongly in favour of greater solidarity on migrant issues at higher levels of Government
183
.  
The Stockholm Programme called for a harmonization of asylum seeker procedures and processing 
and culminated in a workshop on Roma issues with relation to the Stockholm  Programme in early 
September and a conference on the Quality and Efficiency in the Asylum Process in mid-
September. 
9.2.7 European External Action Service  
The European External Action Service (EEAS or EAS) was another area of the Lisbon Treaty that 
needed to be fleshed out through negotiations to define its role and limits of responsibility. During 
the Spanish Presidency there was confusion over who should handle Obama’s visit, resulting in the 
President cancelling his visit due to uncertainty around this issue.  
As a strongly pro-EU Member State, Belgium would be strongly supportive of a clear and defined 
role of a supranational representation on issues of external representation. During the election 
campaign Bart de Weaver suggested that instead of revolution there would be an evolution to 
separate states. He often used the blue background and gold stars of the EU to allude to a broader 
EU involvement in Belgium
184
.  
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9.3 Overview table and legislative record 
Table 10: Overview of the actions and priorities of the Belgian Presidency 
Priority 
Action/ Area 
Congruent with National Interests 
Resulted 
in 
legislation 
Resulted 
in            
policy 
changes 
Resulted in 
increased 
issue 
awareness  
Common 
Patent 
Yes – The growth of the Pirate Party further 
diluted the unstable compromise of the 
Belgian domestic political environment No No Possibly 
Economic  
Yes – Economic initiatives and unemployment 
initiatives aid domestic and trading partners 
economic recovery No Yes Possibly 
Citizen’s 
Initiative No- legacy issue  Yes Yes No 
Stockholm 
Programme 
- 
employment 
No- Legacy issue 
Yes – establishing a pro-green stance 
neutralises domestic green-party objection 
and protest  No Yes Possibly 
EEAS 
Yes –Congruent with pro-EU political 
environment also a Lisbon Treaty 
housekeeping issue that required resolution  Yes Yes No 
Table 11: Legislative action from the Council & the European Parliament 
during the Belgian Presidency 
 
Regulations Directives Decisions 
 
Council 58 8 162 
Council & EP 34 22 2 
 
10. The Hungarian Presidency 
10.1 Negotiating possibilities 
The priorities of the Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian (SBH) trio Presidency were overtaken, in no small 
amount, by the financial crisis and the implementation process of the Lisbon Treaty
185
. In many 
respects, the first trio presidency post-Lisbon was always going to be a process of discovery for the 
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rotating presidency holders to determine their new role and place within the institutional 
environment of the new EU. 
SBH trio priorities were consistent throughout the eighteen month period, however, this did not 
entirely limit the ability of the rotating presidencies to contribute their own personality to the role. 
As a first-time rotating presidency holder, Hungary lacked the experience of EU bureaucracy and 
processes which was highlighted by their handling of the Media Law crisis. However, by 
employing young and enthusiastic staff, Hungary managed to invigorate their presidency with 
young, pro-EU, pro-networking personnel. 
The focus of the Hungarian Presidency can be divided into five of the six SBH trio-presidency 
priorities:  
1) Lisbon treaty implementation 
2) Continuing financial reform  
3) Energy & climate change 
4) European social agenda  
5) External issues and enlargement 
The final priority on the SBH trio-presidency priority list omitted from the Hungarian Presidencies’ 
list was agriculture and fisheries. It is probably important to mention that an omission of a priority 
can be as important as the inclusion and actions of a priority as it defines preference by national 
dis-interest. In the case of Hungary, the landlocked nation has little to no interest in fishing quotas 
and although Hungary receives only 2.5% of the total CAP budget, it is a significant contributor to 
the agricultural sector to which reform could trigger negative wins for Hungary.  
Apart from these issues, the Hungarian Presidency who was present at the time of the Libyan civil 
war “successfully supported and complemented the work of High Representative Ashton…getting 
sanctions through in a fast-track process and providing a diplomatic channel to the Libyan regime 
during the crisis.
186” 
The following summary doesn’t include discussion on the European Social Agenda, financial 
reform and Lisbon Treaty issues as these were rolling issues or legacy issue which the Hungarian 
Presidency inherited rather than agenda-set. In such circumstances the Hungarian Presidency, are 
free to act as honest-brokers. This following section looks at three of the priorities as they relate to 
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Hungarian national interest (Charter of Fundamental Rights, Energy Security & Schengen 
accession of Romania and Bulgaria) as well as two additional policy areas that were in focus during 
this time: The Danube Strategy and Roma Strategy. 
10.2 Following the Belgian Model 
10.2.1  Energy & climate change 
Although energy is becoming a core issue in EU politics
187
, Hungary (like most of the CEE 
Member States) has limited domestic energy supply and is increasingly reliant on the external 
provision of natural gas for electricity production
188
. This currently positions Hungary as reliant on 
gas from Russia. Therefore its support of the Nabucco pipeline, over Gazprom’s South Stream 
pipeline and a common energy policy and an investment commitment to renewable energy develop, 
would provide greater bargaining power from traditional energy suppliers.
189
 
In February 2011, the Hungarian Minister for National Development stated that the “new Member 
States” perceive renewable energy as an economic development issue190. Given that 44% of 
Hungary’s electricity production is powered by gas191, it is clearly in line with national preference 
that during their term in office the Presidency brought forward the discussion of EU investment 
support for renewable energy development, a move that would have directly benefited Hungary and 
placed it in a more favourable bargaining position towards natural gas providers.  
During their term in office the Hungarian Presidency held an energy summit in February and 
meetings in May to create greater common ground and solidarity on issues of energy security and 
efficient energy provision. The primary outcome of these meeting was the endorsement of the 
Energy Strategy and Infrastructure priorities
192
.   
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10.2.2 External issues and enlargement 
With regards to the Stockholm Programme, the Hungarian Presidency continued the rolling 
programme of work as determined under the trio-presidency priorities. As a country attracting 
fewer asylum-seekers, the Hungarian Presidency can be perceived as acting as an honest-broker on 
this issue. 
The implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the consolidation of the right to 
information were a result of the Presidency pairing down the agenda in an effort to build consensus, 
positively affected the pace of progress at the February and April JHA Councils.
193
  However, this 
issue was again a legacy of prior Presidency rather than a clear choice by this Presidency. 
Schengen Accession of Bulgaria and Romania were strongly supported by the Hungarian 
Presidency with several public statements
194
. Although this issue does not represent national 
interests in play it does point to national preferences
195. However, France and Germany’s resistance 
to accession made the March 2011 deadline set by Hungary as difficult within the Hungarian term 
of office. However, the issue was vetoed by the Netherlands and Finland during the following 
Polish rotating-Presidency
196
 .  
10.2.3  The Danube River Strategy 
Announced on the 25th February 2010 in Budapest, the Danube River Strategy (DRS) was aimed at 
sustainably developing the region 
197
. This Strategy has direct benefit to Hungary and it economic 
prosperity and therefore is regarded as a de facto national priority
198
.  The original Committee of 
the Regions opinion document was a general statement with little firm activities or strategies
199
.  
The DRS focuses on issues such as transport, energy, water management, environment, safety and 
social economic development. The Cohesion Policy granted €100Billion between 2007 and 2013200 
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for this project. However, in a situation of persistent financial and economic crisis, expansion of the 
project’s was limited to a realignment of existing funding sources rather than additional funding201. 
Some of the current projects include: the Danube parks initiative which is restoring the 
environmental health and species biodiversity of the river bank area.  The river also acts as a 
transport network and the Danube project aims to increase usage of the river and the efficient 
sharing of maps and communication along the river. Another project is the construction of a bridge 
linking Bulgaria and Romania, contributing to efficient rail and surface transport and therefore 
economic prosperity to the region.  
It is difficult to say exactly what the Hungarian Presidency achieved for the DRS, however, as one 
commentator summarised: “It is, however, more likely that the Hungarian government was really 
seeking to ensure the survival of the framework in the form of a procedural success, and the 
presidency will not go very far in contributing to the development of actual practices under the 
DRS umbrella
202”.  
10.2.4 National Roma Integration Strategies  
In 2001 a census recorded the Roma population of Hungary at 190,046, however unofficial 
estimates reported figures up to 4 times that number. The majority of Hungarian Roma have been 
linguistically assimilated (called the Romungros), however there are also smaller groups who speak 
Romani (the Rom) or archaic Romanian (the Beash)
 203
.  
Since the late 70’s, Hungary has had a programme of assimilation towards the Roma focusing on 
health, education, culture and antidiscrimination, however, Hungary, still struggles with violence 
and discrimination towards the Roma. Amnesty International reported that in 2008, there were 16 
incidents of weapons being used against the Romani, leading to four deaths.   The following year 
the National Bureau of investigations reported the death of a Roma man and his son and believed 
that it was one of several recent attacks connected to the death of four people
204
. 
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Needless to say, this is a long standing domestic issue. The economic crisis has hit Hungary harder 
than many EU Member State and there has been a political shift towards the right—giving the 
Fidesz Party a clear majority in the general election of 2010
205
.  
The EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies by the Commission, also known as 
the Roma Strategy, attempts to shift the poorest and most marginalized citizens of the EU into a 
higher socioeconomic status. This strategy, like the Danube Strategy existed under the proviso that 
no new funds be assigned to these issues
206. Kaczinski believed this policy of “no-new-funding” led 
to the mainstreaming of Roma issues under the social inclusion banner
207
. Although Kaczinski  also 
stated that the Hungary’s ability to be a policy innovator was deeply constrained by the financial 
situation and the larger Member State positions.
208
  
10.3 Overview table and legislative record 
Table 12: Overview of the policies and actions of the Hungarian 
Presidency 
Prioirity 
Action/ Area 
Congruent with National Interests 
Resulted in 
legislation 
Resulted 
in            
policy 
changes 
Resulted in 
increased 
issue 
awareness  
Charter of 
Fundamental 
Rights No – A legacy issue Yes Yes Yes 
Energy 
Security 
Yes  - A common energy policy and 
alternative energy sources provides 
increased competitiveness Yes Yes Yes 
Schengen 
Accession 
Yes – As near neighbours Romania is an 
economic trading partner with an ethic-
Hungarian minority No No Possibly 
Roma Strategy 
Yes – lack of action on Roma issues 
reflects current constituency attitudes No Yes No 
Danube River 
Strategy 
Yes – DRS directly benefits the economy 
and infrastructure of Hungary  No No Yes 
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Table 13: Legislative action from the Council & the European Parliament 
during the Hungarian Presidency 
 
Regulations Directives Decisions 
 
Council 68 8 160 
Council & EP 26 13 20 
 
 
11. Analysis and results 
The research question deals specifically with the effect of the Lisbon Treaty on the role of the 
rotating-presidency’s ability to pursue outcomes that correspond to national interest. A quick review 
of each of the rotating-presidencies reveals a measure of congruency between national interests and 
the initiatives or priorities and outcomes.  
The six rotating-presidencies where initially anticipated to be a research question based on the 
comparison between the trio-presidencies before and after the Lisbon Treaty. However, after 
reviewing the rotating presidencies individually it became apparent that there were three distinct 
phases; 1) pre-Lisbon rotating –presidencies of France and the Czech Republic; 2) the interim 
rotating presidencies of Sweden and Spain pre-occupied with Lisbon Treaty issues; and 3) the post-
Lisbon rotating-presidencies of Belgium and Hungary. 
From the data collected on the rotating-presidencies it was clear that France was setting an agenda 
that was closely aligned to national interests and, to a large extent, was successful in pursuing these 
ends. Similarly the Czech Republic, who despite only holding the position for half the term of 
office managed to negotiate forward steps in a common energy policy and neutralise the Gazprom 
Crisis. 
The interim phase countries of Sweden and Spain had a clearly different experience from the other 
rotating-Presidents of the Council of the EU. Even though they existed under different rules of 
procedure, they faced similar issues. The last pre-Lisbon Treaty rotating-presidency Sweden, had 
little time to pursue its own agenda as issues of settling the mechanics of the Lisbon Treaty into 
place and the ongoing economic crisis were pressing issues. The first rotating-presidency post-
Lisbon was always going to have teething issues negotiating new procedures, however, like 
Sweden, Spain was also preoccupied with treaty implementation. 
69 
 
The third distinct phase was the Belgian and Hungarian rotating-presidencies both of which were 
highly cooperative with the HR and elected-President and behaved as a consensus building 
negotiator with the EP and other Member States. Although there were still opportunities to put 
national interest items on the agenda, the type of issues were distinctly different from France and 
the Czech Republic. Issues were “smaller” or rather less surprising with a heightened 
cooperative/conciliatory spirit. Issues with strong national preference such as the patent issue for 
the Belgians and extra funding for the Danube River Strategy for the Hungarians were quietly 
thwarted. 
11.1 Interim rotating-presidencies 
Where Sweden was hijacked by the Lisbon Treaty and the full realization of the economic crisis, 
Spain had the unenviable task of being the first to step into the “new” rotating-presidency. It was a 
role that they seemed to struggle with, a fact which was highlighted by the botched visit by Obama 
and comments in the press about the lack of visibility of the Spanish President.  The Spanish 
Presidency, like the Swedes, were kept busy realising the details of the Lisbon Treaty and dealing 
with the ongoing economic crisis. Spain, as a Member State strongly experiencing the effects of the 
economic crisis in their domestic market, were unable to command a position of leadership on this 
topic
209
.  
The interim rotating-presidencies leave many unanswered questions regarding their lack of pursuit 
of national interest. For example, Sweden had clear reasons to tweak the negotiations around the 
implementation and manage negotiations around specific treaty issues that would have preserved 
voice and influence for itself and other small states more within the new procedures, however, they 
didn’t appear to do so. 
A potential explanation can be extrapolated from Bunse’s findings which highlights “that in 
repeated games (i.e. future negotiations after their term of office) it pays off to be accommodating 
in the long run.
210” With this in mind, it is possible to consider that if the preferred (and current 
choice) for the President of the European Council is a moderate, medium to small Member State 
representative, then Sweden would have been cognizant of this and could have envisaged itself as a 
potential successor and would therefore have been unwilling to push its own interests and negotiate  
                                                     
209
 Haywood 2011:77 
210
 Bunse 2009:214 
70 
 
One can speculate on the reasons as to why the Swedish Presidency (and to some extent the 
Spanish Presidency) didn’t attempt to adjust the treaty implementation. Athough it is a question that 
clearly requires more research as there was no comment from political or academic sources other 
than to describe the Swedish Presidency as honest-brokers, it is a worthy discussion topic but 
unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. 
11.2 Trends and developments 
The three distinct phases present a clear comparative case study that reveals that there are changes 
in the style and type of initiatives as well as changes in the amount of legislative originating from 
the Council (which is discussed in detail in the following section). 
By isolating the issues that are specific to a particular rotating-presidency (and beyond the shared 
trio priorities), it becomes apparent that the issues change in character. The French Presidency 
tabled CAP reform and the Mediterranean Union (MU), while the Czech Presidency made a 
common energy policy their key issue and managed to stave off protectionist moves within the EU. 
The Swedish and Spanish Presidencies were occupied with the Lisbon Treaty and the “credit 
crunch”. In contrast to the previous presidencies, the Belgians had the common patent initiative and 
the Hungarians attempted to bring light to the Danube River Strategy(DRS), both had limited 
success within their term. 
The types of issues being tackled are also relevant: CAP reform, the MU and the common energy 
policy are big issues which received significant attention. Additionally, these initiatives were 
reasonably successful, and in the case of the MU the results were maybe not what the French had 
initially envisaged, but still successful enough to revamp the Barcelona Process and create a new 
secretariat. By contrast the DRS failed to secure more funding and the common patent legislation 
failed to find common ground – both issues are relatively small in comparison and didn’t manage 
to conclude successfully.  
It is possible to view these issues as relating to the relative power of the Member State holding the 
Presidency, until we consider the Czech Presidency. As a first-time holder of the rotating-
presidency whose unstable domestic politics dissolved during the Presidency, it is surprising the 
Czechs still managed to steer a common energy policy home and hold the line against larger 
Member States economic protectionism. In comparison, Belgium could not boast this achievement 
even though they also existed under a caretaker government (for the complete duration of their 
term). That is not to say that the Belgian Presidency didn’t achieve much, it is the type of 
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achievements that differed—Belgium focused on treaty implementation work such as finalizing the 
EEAS, but failed to negotiate a consensus position on the common patent regulations.  
11.3 Legislative Trends 
Although the European Council has no formal legislative power, it can request that the Commission 
submit a proposal, enabling the Council to act as a policy entrepreneur
211
. As the chair of the 
Council, the rotating-presidency has had considerable opportunities to act as a policy entrepreneur 
and turn the focus of the Council and the legislative bodies to areas that coincide with Member 
State interests.  
As the role of the rotating-Presidency, prior to the Lisbon Treaty, was to set the agenda of work for 
the Council who could suggest to the Commission to submit issues for legislation, it is appropriate 
to review the legislation originating from the Council during this period of time. What becomes 
apparent is a clear downward trend in the number of directives and regulations originating from the 
Council after the Lisbon Treaty came into effect. Below is a graphical representation of the figures 
presented in the data from each of the observed rotating-presidencies. In the pre-Lisbon trio 
presidencies the average number of Directives originating from the Council was 16 (a high of 24 
under the Czech Republic  and a low of 14 during the Swedish Presidency. In a post-Lisbon 
environment the average was halved to only eight directives per term of office.  
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Diagram 2: Directives originating from the Council July 2008-June 2011 
 
Source: EUR-lex – Appendix D 
A similar fate was apparent for regulations: in the pre-Lisbon era regulations didn’t drop below 87, 
whereas the post-Lisbon trio climbed from a low of 48 regulations (passed during Spain’s term), to 
58 during Belgium’s term and ending with a high of 68 during Hungary’s term.  
Diagram 3: Regulations originating from the Council July 2008-June 2011 
 
Source: EUR-lex – Appendix D 
Given that there is a recovery trend in regulations, it could be a sign that for every subsequent 
rotating-presidency there could be incremental improvement in figures back to pre-Lisbon levels. 
However, the very flat eight directives per rotating-Presidency since the introduction of the Lisbon 
Treaty don’t show much sign of improvement or change. These graphs clearly indicate a reduction 
in the legislative vigour of the rotating-presidency of the Council of the EU. 
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11.4 Other Specific Observations 
11.4.1 Constellations of power – Belgium-Belgium 
What was perhaps the most interesting to observe during the Post-Lisbon trio was the interaction of 
the elected & rotating-presidencies, to see if there were any same or aligned Member States 
constellations of power that would enable greater success for a Member State’s national interest 
ambitions. In the case of the Belgian-Belgian constellation the support came from the Member 
State to the elected-President. This assisted the implementation process and the strengthened the 
role of the elected-President but did not further realization of national interests for Belgium.  
The most logical reason for the lack of assistance from Van Rompuy is the newness of the elected-
Presidency which meant that it would be heavily scrutinized and any potential favoritism could 
have potentially jeopardised the legitimacy of the role, the Lisbon Treaty and potentially the EU. It 
will be interesting in the future to observe if less obvious constellations of power between 
like/aligned nations could assist in the realisation of Member State national interests– however, this 
research revealed no linkages in that direction.   
Another, more political motivation for Van Rompuy lack bolstering support for the Belgian 
rotating-presidency may be the caretaker status of the Presidency. Success could have boosted the 
credibility of the opposition party (or worse, legitimized the political deadlock) and potentially 
provided no benefit to the party that Van Rompuy once presided over. 
 
12. Conclusions 
This thesis attempts to answer the question of how institutional changes to the role of the 
Presidency of the Council of EU (rotating-Presidency) will impact the evolution of the EU as a 
whole. The research question deals specifically with how these changes directly affect the ability of 
the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of EU to set the agenda and chair specific 
meetings. As consequence of the removal of rotating-presidency as an agenda setter and negotiation 
manager from much of the work of the Council, it becomes possible to determine which of the 
characteristics of leadership and negotiation have potentially the most significance.  
As rational actors, Member States will pursue national interests within the boundaries of the 
institutional and cultural constraints (norms). As a consensus-driven positive-sum culture
212
, 
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negotiations are tempered with the understanding of repeated games. In other words, negotiations 
don’t exist in a vacuum and actors will seek a common position rather than force a win once only to 
lose legitimacy and subsequent negotiations. 
There are three major findings from this research: firstly, Member States are still pursuing national 
interest, however, the methods required to achieve national interest outcomes has changed (from 
driving change to coordinating change) and secondly, the type of national interest being pursued is 
distinctly different (own initiatives to shared initiatives) after the Lisbon Treaty.  
The final conclusion relates to leadership roles and the ability of the chair to achieve national 
outcomes. These cases have shown that the type of national interests and way in which they are 
pursued has changed, which in turn reveals that of all the negotiation roles assigned to the chair, it 
is the agenda-setting powers that are most important. For without the agenda-setting power, a 
negotiating chair has limited opportunity to place issues of interest on the agenda for discussion. 
12.1 Driving from the back seat – coordinating change 
This research uncovered a change in the way in which the new rotating-presidency functions—as 
demonstrated by the Belgian and Hungarian cooperative and coordinating strategies. The Spanish 
Presidency attempted to continue as if the pre-Lisbon status of the rotating-presidency still applied, 
the results of which could be seen in failed Obama visit.  
By contrast, it was Belgium who demonstrated how through cooperation and support for the 
elected-President, the rotating-Presidency could successfully deliver on the trio-priorities and 
Hungary followed in kind supporting the role of High Representative Ashton during the Libyan 
civil-conflict.   
Belgium and Hungary spent significant amounts of time coordinating positions within the Council 
and the EP. As a go-between, the rotating-presidency has significant role to play. This go-
between/co-ordinating role has previously been utilized by pre-Lisbon rotating-presidencies to 
secure outcomes that favour their own national interests. One such example of a rotating-
presidency using its position as a mediator between the Council and the EP was Sweden’s rotating-
Presidency of 2001. Tallberg discussed the Swedish Presidency of 2001 in depth highlighting how 
this mediating and representative role is a key characteristic of leadership
213
. The Swedish 
Presidency of 2001 negotiated transparency legislation by beginning negotiations with the EP 
before there was a common position within the Council. This way Sweden could play off the pro-
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transparency EP against the pro-secrecy elements of the Council and secure a position that was 
very close to its own national preferences
214
.  
The difference today is that the rotating-presidency will be playing in this area far more often than 
previous presidencies, but it also represents a clear advantage area for the rotating-presidency is 
they so choose to use it. 
12.2 Issues of consensus 
Although rotating-presidencies still pursue national interest, the type and success of proposed 
issues that are congruent with national interest have changed. France and the Czech Republic were 
clearly pursuing and achieving national interest outcomes, whereas Belgium and Hungary struggled 
or failed to reach a consensus position on their issues of interest.  
Movement away from “own” issues such as blatant pursuit and more towards issues that already 
hold significant or low-cost issues such as the violence against women initiative  proposed by 
Spain. 
The change in the type and amount of legislation has the direct impact of changing the course of 
EU evolution. It may be that there is greater consistency of direction in legislative and policy 
development, however, it will lack the diversity of voices that the rotating-presidency gave. Former 
Commission President Jacques Santer said: “My personal experience confirms the fact that every 
six months, impetus and new dynamism are given to the work of the EU, while longer term 
presidency would no doubt curtail permanent motivation”215. The effect of which is reduced 
legislative vigour, which could lead to reduced interest in the European integration project and a 
loss of legitimacy for the EU. 
12.3 Leadership and negotiation in the EU 
The reduced ability of rotating-presidencies to set the agenda affects the amount and type of 
legislation being produced. Agenda-setting is the primary institutional characteristic which is 
limited by the Lisbon Treaty changes. The change in agenda-setting powers effectively alters how a 
Member State can table new issues that may become legislation or policy. It is therefore, only after 
agenda-setting that a chair can control negotiations and guide the brokerage procedures to 
conclusions that are most favourable and congruent with their national interests.  
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The analysis of the six Member States who held the presidencies between July 2008 and June 2011 
clearly demonstrated how the Lisbon Treaty has limited the powers of the rotating-presidency and 
resulted in a significant drop in regulations and directives originating from the Council. It is 
therefore possible to extrapolate that, of all the powers the chair has at its disposal, its role as 
agenda-setter is the most significant in enabling the chair to secure favourable outcomes. 
From the data collected it is clear that the characteristics of leadership conferred asymmetric power 
on the chair (through agenda-setting & management and informational resources due to increased 
access to other actors preferences and confidential information) are impacted by changing the 
institutional procedures. What cannot be proven from this research is whether the larger states have 
inherent resources available to them to overcome the changes.  
Power resources such as the number of votes within the Council and the number of seats held in 
European Parliament could allow Member States to realize national interests more effectively. 
However, this would require closer coordination between national and EU-level political 
representatives—the effects of which could lead to a greater political synergies, encourage 
integration and potentially increase the legitimacy of the EU at the constituency level. Although 
Spain is one of the larger states of the EU, its term fell within the interim presidency timeframe and 
didn’t allow it the possibility to explore these possibilities. 
What is clear is that the smaller-states that could be observed during the post-Lisbon era, struggled 
to get their voice heard and to find consensus within the Council on issues that were close to their 
own national interest. This has obvious ramifications for other smaller-states and the evolution of 
the EU, as discussed in Bunse. As the rotating-presidency previously gave voice to the specific 
national interest issues, the changes in the ability of small-states to set the agenda severely curtails 
these states’ abilities to highlight issues that are close to the hearts of their constituents.  
Hirschman’s theory of exit as discussed by Weiler216 with regard to EU integration, can easily be 
applied to this situation. From this point it would be possible to conjecture that there could be 
potential backlash, especially from smaller-states asking for increased exit in the face of reduced 
voice and ability to affect change. Secondly, it could slow the accession of other smaller states to 
the EU as they are required to relinquish sovereignty (reduced exit) with a reduced ability to 
participate and initiate development (reduced voice).  
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If larger states are also impacted and there is a reduction in the ability of all member-states to 
influence outcomes in the EU, it could potentially trigger (in the longer term) a reaction from 
member states to increase exit to account for the lack of voice. However, as the elected-president is 
most likely to be a moderate from a smaller state there could be a stagnation in the EU and a loss of 
legislative and policy vitality that could further erode voter interest and democratic legitimacy of 
the EU.  
12.5 Further Research 
One of the major surprises of this research was the “exception” Presidencies of the Council of the 
EU, Sweden and Spain. These interim presidencies deserve further research as they could shed 
light on the circumstance by which actors are “forced” into honest broker roles. Interestingly the 
interim phase presidencies seem to have been impacted more by the situational demands of 
implementing the Lisbon Treaty, than by the changes in the rules of the game. This is not to say 
they neither the Swedish or Spanish rotating-presidency didn’t potentially achieve some national 
interest outcomes but that the primary output of these presidencies, as reported by political 
commentators and academics, was more contingent on crises and circumstance than plan. 
Additionally, the outcomes that were in line with national interest were weak, low-priority for other 
actors or diffuse. Examples of this include the violence against women initiative introduced under 
the Spanish Presidency—an issue with low-cost for Member States 
These interim presidencies could reveal much about the boundaries of norms and the civilizing 
effect of publicity on political leadership. Alternatively, the behaviour of the interim presidencies 
could reflect that norms change depending on the longevity and permanence of an issue. In other 
words, issues that have longer term impacts and are less open to significant alteration will force 
negotiating-chairs to be more responsive to bargaining and encourage honest-broker consensus 
management. 
As time goes on it will be interesting to track future rotating-presidencies that are able to secure 
national interest outcomes. Will larger Member States have more “friends” and voting power in the 
EP and therefore be more successful in achieving national interest outcomes.   
Another area for further research is observing how aligned brokers could potentially create 
constellations of leadership that magnify the potential outcomes congruent with national interest. 
However, it will take time before a pattern could potentially emerge. 
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Appendix A – Legislative Origin Statistics of the EU  
(1 July 2008-30 June 2011) 
 
  
French 
Presidency 
 Czech 
Presidency 
Swedish 
Presidency 
Spanish 
Presidency 
Belgian  
Presidency 
Hungarian 
Presidency 
Regulations Total 835 1060 886 723 846 717 
EP and Council 37 46 62 34 34 26 
Council 111 146 87 48 58 68 
Commission 680 865 730 641 751 623 
Other 7 3 7 0 3 0 
  
French 
Presidency 
 Czech 
Presidency 
Swedish 
Presidency 
Spanish 
Presidency 
Belgian  
Presidency 
Hungarian 
Presidency 
Directives Total 95 132 130 71 95 80 
EP and Council 36 57 58 17 22 13 
Council 16 24 14 8 8 8 
Commission 43 51 56 46 65 59 
Other 0 0 2 0 0 0 
  
French 
Presidency 
 Czech 
Presidency 
Swedish 
Presidency 
Spanish 
Presidency 
Belgian  
Presidency 
Hungarian 
Presidency 
Decisions Total 438 446 443 378 438 376 
EP and Council 20 9 15 13 30 5 
Council 125 158 159 151 162 160 
Commission 273 245 249 191 211 192 
Other 20 34 20 23 35 19 
              
 
Source: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Stats.do?context=legislative&ihmlang=en  
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